Why am I passionate about this?
I am a historian of modern (post-1898) American military history who has been fortunate enough to be at a university that supports my research. I have always been fascinated by the “black holes” in military history, the topics that are not glamorous like the big wars, charismatic generals, or Washington-level civil-military relations. This has led me to study such obscure topics as the conquest and pacification of the Philippines, the forty-year plans for Pacific defense prior to World War II, and how military officers have envisioned future war. The peacetime US Army is a terrific “black hole” because so many people, civilians, and military, assume that they already know that history.
Brian's book list on the peacetime US Army
Why did Brian love this book?
A pathbreaking study of the century-long transformation from frontier constabulary and border protection force to a modern army organized to wage industrial warfare against a rival Great Power. Clark brilliantly traces the intellectual evolution of Army concepts of future conflict, how they were shaped by experiences and observations of war, and the emergence of distinct generations of reformers. Exceptionally well researched and written, Clark’s work undermines much of both the historical and theoretical interpretations of military reform, proving that the path to the modern army was tortuous, contested, and uneven, with yesterday’s reformers becoming today’s reactionaries. The book is not only a terrific history, it is essential reading for those who want to understand today’s Army.
1 author picked Preparing for War as one of their favorite books, and they share why you should read it.
The U.S. Army has always regarded preparing for war as its peacetime role, but how it fulfilled that duty has changed dramatically over time. J. P. Clark traces the evolution of the Army between the War of 1812 and World War I, showing how differing personal experiences of war and peace among successive generations of professional soldiers left their mark upon the Army and its ways.
Nineteenth-century officers believed that generalship and battlefield command were more a matter of innate ability than anything institutions could teach. They saw no benefit in conceptual preparation beyond mastering technical skills like engineering and…