Fans pick 100 books like The Deaths of Others

I did well in history growing up, but an accident at a mountain in the 7th grade had me laid up and reading a book about Native Americans in their own words. At that point, I knew they weren’t teaching us everything.

Finding Howard Zinn later was the motherlode of what history teachers hadn’t taught us, and I absorbed it.

I came across the work of Nick Turse while working on the fifth chapter of my new book. I had been struggling to find a critical voice in the assessment of the American war in Vietnam that was sustained by a keen historical eye and the pure, intellectual critique of a scholar. When I found Turse, I found my answers.

Turse’s assessment of the unmitigated brutality of the American war in Vietnam chilled me; his powerful critique brought a new voice and vigor to my own burgeoning criticism of that U.S. slaughter in Southeast Asia.

Anyone looking for a strong voice condemning wholesale the U.S. anti-communist paranoia of the era and/or the indiscriminate killing capacity of the U.S. military machine need look no further than Turse and Kill Anything that Moves. 

I would not be the historian or social critic I am today without the guidance of the scholarship of Stephen Kinzer. From his prolific histories about Iran or the Middle East more broadly to his courageous dissection of the international crimes of the CIA, Kinzer’s views on American foreign policy are as relevant as they are important for the development of a complete worldview of contemporary international politics.

In this book, Kinzer brings all of these tools to bear in demonstrating how, time and again, the United States pursued selfish interests to the detriment of millions around the globe, usually with power and riches subsequently being shifted into the hands of American political elites.

Kinzer’s book is informative, provocative, and engaging and, therefore, makes for a necessary companion to my own work in this field. 

David Keen, as his name would imply, has a tremendously keen eye for mendacity and chicanery in political systems. I sought out Keen when I needed a scholarly voice speaking truth to power and representing the interests of the people against the overwhelming dominance of the interests of states and governments, namely, the United States.

Keen helped me to understand the true, dystopic dimensions of the ongoing U.S. War on Terror and the methods by which it continues to be prosecuted around the world. This nightmare of never-ending U.S. war is much larger and much more intractable than even I anticipated before picking up Keen’s book.

Through reading Endless War? I came to understand the true nature of this state-sanctioned violence committed around the world. It is not a lesson nor a book that I will soon forget. 

This book entertains while recounting the militarization of our foreign policy. Post-retirement, I worked briefly for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and later as a contractor helping to train military units headed for Iraq and Afghanistan. Our professional military is a superb fighting machine but the decisions to invade Iraq and Afghanistan inevitably resulted in challenges diplomats and development workers are best equipped to handle. The budget-slashing reinvention of government during the Clinton years meant there weren’t enough trained civilians to handle existing priorities much less a surge to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan. As Rosa Brooks writes, from the perspective of both an insider and a superb reporter, the military became everything. The military had the money while civilian agencies like State and USAID were underfunded.

This book genuinely changes our understanding of British defence policy before the First World War. It is often assumed that the German challenge to British naval supremacy before 1914 was a mirage and that fears that Germany might launch an invasion of the British Isles were simple scaremongering. The reality was different. The Royal Navy may have been bigger and stronger than its German counterpart, but its task was harder and its leaders were not confident that they could prevent German soldiers from landing on British soil. Based on first-rate research, this book explains why.

Nothing is more American than making war in other countries, and Phil Klay’s collection of essays investigates that line between those Americans who fight in our current wars and those who get to stay home and eventually forget that there’s even a war taking place somewhere. Klay knows about what he writes. He’s a former marine who was stationed in Iraq, and while not seeing combat himself, he did see firsthand the complex relationship between occupied and occupier. Upon his return home, he was plunged into an even more surreal place: a country that had long since stopped paying attention. Bonus reading: Klay’s National Book Award-winning short story collection, Redeployment, where you can see how fiction becomes transmuted into nonfiction and vice versa.

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki no one knew, with certainty, the outcomes of Western techno-scientific progress.

If governmental laboratories had been able to develop in secrecy bombs that could wipe out an entire city, then how sanguine could anyone be of fruits of scientific research?

Dr. Hamblin shows how scientists in Western laboratories exceeded even the most outlandish sci-fi fantasies of the Cold War.

In addition to developing biological and radiological weapons, scientists explored various ways to exploit crop destruction, massive fires, artificial earthquakes and tsunamis, ocean current manipulation, sea level tinkering, weather control, and even climate change in the coming World War III.

The author does not pull any punches. She investigates the Japanese path to the Pearl Harbor attack, from cultural constraints that made it challenging to resist the drift to war to personality assessments that help make sense of the decisions to strike the US, even when war games demonstrated that the country could not win a confrontation.

Despite knowing the outcome of the attack, the story is so well told that delving into the steps toward conflict is engrossing. The book makes you wonder: What might have stopped the attack? If we knew then what we know now, would the attack at Pearl Harbor have been a surprise?  

In this book, the closest thing we have to a traditional work of national security on this list, the brilliant (and funny) iconoclast John Mueller asks a simple question: Why don’t more people realize just how stupid war is?

Why, for instance, as Greek soldiers loaded into boats to attack Troy because of a kidnapping, did no one comment on the sheer stupidity of the whole operation? Mueller reviews the history of this stupidity and recommends that his country give more consideration to steering clear of them in the future.

All wars the United States fights are, to use the common parlance, “wars of choice.” We always have the option to not engage, a choice that would usually leave us better off.