100 books like The International Relations of the Persian Gulf

After the US it is Iran. In fact the US is in the Gulf thanks and due to Iran. Iran poses a, real or perceived, security risk to other littoral states of the Gulf and balancing it constitutes the latter’s sublime foreign policy objective. It is also due to Iran that the Arab Gulf states spend billions of dollars on their armaments and engage in proxy-power struggles in other parts of the Middle East. Why is Iran a pariah in the Gulf? For a solid account read this book.

What are the constituents of the risk Iran poses to the Arab Gulf states? Military? Yes. Ideological? Yes. Rival in the regional influence game? Definitely. But, among all, in my personal view, the trans-border distribution of Shias in the Middle East and in the Gulf is the most serious one. For worse, this book shows, the Shias also constitute a transnational community linked through religious networks. Hence Iran’s hegemonic rise will seriously complicate the problem the presence of Shias poses for at least two, potentially three Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and potentially Kuwait. To see the root cause of the Gulf’s Iran/Shia problem, read this book.

Besides the US and Iran there are others: especially China as an alternative hegemon/gendarmerie to the US, Russia as a partner in OPEC+, India, South Korea, Japan as major consumers of Gulf oil and natural gas, Egypt and Turkey as potential regional strategic allies, UK and France as old imperial centers and new destinations for Gulf capital, and Brazil as a giant economic power. This edited volume covers it all and as such is an indispensable read for a comprehensive look at the external powers that matter, and will matter, in international politics of the Gulf.

Security is the prime issue in the international politics of the Gulf. Not just in the narrow military sense. In the broadest sense too. This book takes a comprehensive and in-depth look at the multitude of risks the Arab Gulf states faces, not only military kind (read Iran), but also food and water, environment and climate, sustaining standards of living in the face of a multitude of economic challenges and potential regional state failures. This book is unquestionably a must-read to have a deeper understanding of the complexity of problems the Arab Gulf states have to resolve, some of which are unique to the Gulf, some are not. It will be epic to survive them.

Rosenberg, whose knowledge of Israeli and U.S. politics provides a great background for his writing, has produced several series, all of which are excellent. But if you’re new to this author, I recommend reading this book first. His political thrillers are spellbinding, especially since Rosenberg foretold the 9/11 disaster and the killing of Saddam Hussein in his novels. In The Last Jihad, Saddam is hell-bent on attacking the West. On the eve of a treaty signing that may ensure peace for Israel and Palestine, the Israelis discover an Iraqi Scud missile armed with a nuclear warhead. It’s clear that Hussein is planning an attack on major U.S. cities and Tel Aviv, and Israel issues an ultimatum to the USA—take Saddam out or we’ll do it instead. This book is a fascinating tale about events that are as real and as possible as today’s newscasts. 

David Crist is the historian of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff—and the son of former CENTCOM Commander, General George B. Crist.  He knows this subject backwards and forwards and brings to light any number of topics that I had only ever seen discussed in the classified world. But he does so with the perspicacity of a military historian and the insight of a superb military analyst. Most people simply do not know about the many close calls and bloody clashes there were between the U.S. and Iran during this era, and Crist’s book fills that important gap. Moreover, this is a fascinating example of a protracted, low-intensity or “hybrid” conflict with a canny and determined foe and so it has no end of lessons to teach. 

In this book, Sandal and Fox directly connect religion to mainstream international relations.

They survey the “grand paradigms” of international relations theory and discuss the various ways religion can be integrated into each. This was a useful exercise as both skeptics and champions of religion’s role in international relations have argued it is wholly separate from existing theories.

To me, its most valuable contribution was their suggestion that religion can be a source of the power and resources states struggle over, in contrast to many scholars on religion and international relations who assume religion overcomes power politics.

They also discussed religious legitimacy as a potential tool for states. These provided a useful starting point for my exploration of religion as an often-disruptive force in foreign policy.      

Sick, Carter’s White House adviser on Iran, offers a cogent, deeply insightful account of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the seizure of American hostages in Tehran, and the Carter Administration’s inadequate response to the unfolding crisis. In a later book, The October Surprise, Sick falls just short of proving that the Reagan campaign conspired with the Iranian government to delay the release of the hostages until after the 1980 election. But he is convincing in his claim that the truth in this sordid affair has never fully come to light.

In terms of Scottish political and cultural history, this is a hugely important book that will astonish and delight everyone engaged in the matter of Scotland. What impresses is the range and scope of Murray Pittock’s global vision for Scotland, but what engages is the minute human detail of the people in the diaspora that he reveals to us, positive and negative. This is the polar opposite of dry history, it is a magisterial work that Scots will actively return to again and again, as we redefine our role in Europe and the world in the 21st Century. I have interviewed Murray for several BBC programmes and he has always come across as a brilliant communicator, who like me, is passionate about Scotland.

In Accidental Superpower, Zeihan primary thesis is “stuff is hard to move; stuff is easier to move by water than land. And then he explains that the natural wealth, not just in soil, but in the river flow allowing traffic from Pittsburgh to New Orleans and the world enabled farmers coming to the Illinois prairie to get a plow in the ground immediately, without having to spend years clearing a forest, and then get the crops down river to markets within the same year. That nowhere in the history of the world had it been so easy to develop a marketable surplus and get it to market. All very interesting facts. But I think novelizing the frontier, watch men struggle against the wilderness to create wealth with exactly these conditions is far more interesting than a mere recitation. Zeihan and I tell the same story but in very different ways.