Fans pick 100 books like The Maisky Diaries

John “Jock” Colville, a 24-year-old Foreign Office staffer, was assigned to work at 10 Downing Street, Britain’s equivalent of the White House, at the outbreak of World War II. When Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as prime minister, Colville, who kept a detailed secret diary, chronicled the new leader’s every move as he rallied his countrymen to keep fighting Hitler’s Germany. His entries for this critical period offer a vivid behind-the-scenes portrait of Churchill, his inner circle—and his strenuous efforts to forge a close partnership with President Roosevelt, who had vowed to keep his country out of the war.

Harold Nicolson was a conservative member of Parliament and staunch supporter of Churchill, who also worked in the Information Ministry. While he publicly echoed Churchill’s rhetoric of defiance and optimism, his private letters and diary indicate how close to despair he was about Britain’s chances after the fall of France. He made a suicide pact with his wife and secured poison pills they pledged to use if German forces invaded their country. Nicolson wrote to her that he did not fear an “honorable death,” but he did fear “being tortured and humiliated.” All of which demonstrated the perilous position of Britain in late 1940 and early 1941, when it was far from certain which side would prevail in the conflict.

Lee was the popular, well-connected military attaché in the U.S. Embassy in London. A staunch supporter of U.S. aid for Britain, he played an important role in preparing for America’s entry into the war. During the Blitz, he castigated American correspondents who described London as “devastated” by the German bombing campaign. “London is not devastated, and if you want one soldier’s opinion, it will not be devastated,” he told them. His diary reflects his determination to counter the defeatist predictions of Joseph Kennedy, who had served as U.S. ambassador in London until 1940.

Leave it to Churchill to sum up the events of 1941 that determined the ultimate outcome of the war. In his words, the theme of this volume of his epic account of the war is “How the British fought on with Hardship their Garment until Soviet Russia and the United States were drawn into the Great Conflict.” Much of this consists of letters, reports, speeches, and other original documents from that period, woven together by its skillful narrator. Little wonder that Churchill was later awarded the Noble Prize in Literature "for his mastery of historical and biographical description as well as for brilliant oratory in defending exalted human values.”

Outside of specialists, few people know about the complex international relations that developed in the Near East in the 2nd millennium BC, during the Middle and Late Bronze Age when Egyptian, Hittite, Babylonian, Assyrian, and Mitannian kings competed to gain power, prestige, and territory. Leaders created an intricate system of treaty agreements, diplomatic protocols, trade relations, and dynastic marriages to further their aims and keep peace. (Wars played a big role as well.) Diplomatic correspondence from these periods reveals the personalities of the kings involved: some complain, some wheedle, and others command, but all are anxious to retain power and earn the support of their gods. Well-chosen quotes from ancient sources and Podany’s lively writing style make this a rewarding and entertaining read. 

Although women have worked in diplomacy, their experiences serving in the United State Foreign Service are little known or understood. Her experience began in 1944 and she represented the USA in many countries, from Honduras to Zambia, in the State Department. Advancing your career and learning foreign languages while facing the professional challenges of operating in a wide variety of consulates and embassies makes for a fascinating story and explains a different perspective.

I love this book because I miss the days when people of great influence in America disagreed vociferously about important matters but remained good friends. Top State and Defense Department official Paul Nitze and legendary diplomat and writer George Kennan were the ying and yang of America’s post-World War II foreign policy–the former a brusque “hawk,” the latter a soft-spoken “dove.”

They battled in the halls of power and in public forums throughout the Cold War, each hoping to implant his views on U.S. foreign policy. Nitze lived to 97, Kennan to 101, and they were close pals to the very end. I wish we’d see more of that warm and friendly competition in Washington today.

Richter recounts the stories of four extraordinary professional diplomats who served post 9/11 and are role models for the diplomats of the future. Anne Patterson, U.S. ambassador in Egypt and Pakistan, worked for me briefly in Washington and Riyadh. I crossed paths with Ryan Crocker, U.S. ambassador in Iraq and Afghanistan, many times in Washington, Baghdad, and elsewhere. I met Chris Stevens once before he became U.S. ambassador in Libya. The political exploitation of his death was outrageous. I didn’t know Robert Ford, who resigned in frustration over U.S. policy toward Syria. They were sent to dangerous and unstable places. Diplomacy can be risky. They had to work closely were their military counterparts. They experienced the frustration of advising Washington politicians who lack both understanding and a willingness to listen. 

Like Sebag Montefiore and Mawdsley, Raack was the first diplomatic historian to re-evaluate Stalin’s foreign policy in light of documents which became available after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. He exploded numerous myths about the supposed Soviet interest in “collective security” in the 1930s, showing that this was mere projection on the part of French and British and Czechoslovak statesmen who saw what they wanted to see in Stalin’s foreign policy, which was just as territorially “revisionist” as that of Italy, Germany, and Japan, just as expansionist – but better camouflaged.

Voorhees' assessment of John F. Kennedy's leadership during the Cuban missile crisis is strikingly different from most books on the subject. He examines JFK's decision-making through the lens of the president's domestic political concerns and use of back-channel diplomacy with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev rather than through the conventional workings of his foreign and national security policy establishments. He also challenges the prevailing view that Kennedy's ultimate strategy for resolving the crisis was primarily shaped by the “ExComm” or by the top officials at the Pentagon, State Department, and CIA. Voorhees insists, supported by an impressive array of evidence, that the Cuban missile crisis did not bring the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon and his book promises to become an integral part of the historical conversation.