Fans pick 100 books like Abyss

Greg Baughen had written over a million words on the evolving role and functions of the Royal Air Force from its foundation in 1918 to the post-second world war period, then decided to find a publisher!

The work is thus published in a number of volumes this being the fourth. Never frightened to challenge conventional wisdom the author deals with the RAF and British Government’s preoccupation with strategic bombing at the cost of developing effective tactical air power. As he notes German occupation of much of Europe was accomplished on the ground with effective air support.

Thomas McKelvey Cleaver is a screenwriter of some considerable experience and it shows in his writing. Of late he has been a prolific writer, especially on aspects of the air war in the Pacific and post-war in Korea.

His work is a combination of authoritative research and verbatim accounts collected firsthand from those who were there. His writing is highly readable, without being patronising, and in this volume he describes the contribution of naval air power to the United Nations' fight against North Korea.

A characteristic of all of Cleaver’s writing is that he looks beyond the United States: thus in this book he includes a full description of the part played by Britain’s Fleet Air Arm.

Despite the United States doing its post-war best to accelerate the disintegration of British, French, and Dutch empires, the nation funded some 75% of the cost of the French fight against communist Viet Minh forces.

Martin Windrow, an accomplished editor, has here produced a masterpiece and certainly the definitive account of the battle for Dien Bien Phu and the political and military context. Such is the power of the book that I was compelled to visit the battle site in 2006 and marvel that any military commander would consider building a base in a bowl.

There are many lessons to be learned from the battle, political, strategic, and tactical. The book is referenced and includes clear maps and orders of battle. Just superb.

In respect of covert post-war aerial intelligence gathering there is a great deal of rumour, misinformation, and disinformation.

What I like about Listening In is that the authors have undertaken thorough research and rather than speculating have compiled what is otherwise spread around in the public domain: occasionally, for example, US sources give more detail of RAF operations than British sources. The book gives details of probing and overflight missions, including some American ones, and includes numerous diagrams, maps, and photographs.

The book is also a good example of the publishing values of Hikoki Publications.

I was researching a novel and wanted to know more about the Cuban Missile Crisis. This non-fiction book reads like an action thriller, going hour by hour, sometimes minute by minute.

I finished this one in a single weekend and felt almost physically sick at the thought of how close the world had come to Armageddon in those few tense days and how lucky we were the leaders of the time were so determined to avoid it.

Would our leaders today be as level-headed? You judge!

This book was written by one of the leading photographic interpreters of the Cold War. He worked directly under Art Lundahl at the National Photographic Interpretive Center (NPIC) in preparing and briefing President Kennedy on the high-altitude U-2 and low-level RF-8A Crusader's photoreconnaissance imagery that confirmed Soviet missiles in Cuba. Dino Brugioni was a family friend and a mentor to me as a young adult. He personally escorted me thru the CIA headquarters in 1977 when I was 12 years old shortly after my father’s death earlier that year. When I founded The Cold War Museum in 1996, Dino agreed to serve as an Advisory Board Member. Dino is a great writer and researcher. This book really helps the reader to learn about the importance of photographic reconnaissance, Cuban Missile Crisis, and how close we came to nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

I first met Colonel Whitten in October 2012 when he attended the Cuban Missile Crisis 50th Anniversary conference that I organized for The Cold War Museum and George Mason University. His book is a nonfiction narrative about the Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 2 (VMCJ-2) that flew low-level photographic reconnaissance flights over Cuba before, during, and after the Crisis in their F8U-1P (RF-8A) Crusaders. As a result of these missions, the VMCJ-2 squadron was awarded a Navy Unit Commendation for the period September 1, 1960 – December 1, 1962. According to USMC Brigadier General William A. Bloomer (ret) who wrote the forward, this book not only gives an account of the Marine Corps role in the Crisis but also, “recounts Castro’s rise to power, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and his build up in military capabilities courtesy of the Soviet Union.”

Norman Polmar and I have been colleagues and friends for over 20 years. Not only have we served together on several Cold War history panels including the DIA’s 60th-anniversary conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis in 2022, but we also co-authored the Epilog for my father’s book, Operation Overflight, when it was republished in 2004. Polmar’s book is an in-depth study of the personalities that orchestrated the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even the title, DEFCON-2, emphasizes exactly how close we came to launching an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union in October 1962.

I find that this book is as gripping and suspenseful as any Cold War novel. Yes, I knew the ending: the United States and the Soviets avoided nuclear war. But it is fascinating to read about the internal discussions and secret negotiations that took place throughout the crisis.

I tend to be skeptical of the mythology surrounding John F. Kennedy, but this book did give me a new appreciation for his leadership during this critical moment of the Cold War. 

The books discussed above concentrate on the missile crisis in the US, but there was also a crisis in Moscow and Havana. Americans called this event “the Cuban missile crisis,” the Soviets called it “the Caribbean Crisis,” and the Cubans “the October crisis”—because conflict with the US had become a recurring fact of life in Cuba. The Kennedy administration had also been sponsoring sabotage and political assassination in Cuba kept secret from the American people but well known to the Russians and the Cubans. The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis opens a window into Castro’s fury at not being informed or consulted about the secret October 27 Kennedy-Khrushchev deal to remove the missiles from both Cuba and Turkey; only the masterful November diplomacy by Khrushchev’s personal envoy in Cuba, Anastas Mikoyan, kept the deal on track.