My favorite books to understand voter preferences and democratic decision-making

Downs does a great job of explaining how democratic decision-making links voter preferences to public policy outcomes. He looks at political preferences as existing on a left-to-right continuum and concludes that democratic elections tend to select the candidates whose preferences most closely reflect the median voter—the voter whose preferences fall in the middle of that left-right continuum. He offers a few caveats, one being that because one vote has a vanishingly small chance to affect an election outcome, voters tend to be rationally ignorant on political matters. There is no payoff to becoming informed because an election outcome will be the same regardless of how any individual voter votes.

Olson focuses on the impact of interest groups on public policy. He emphasizes the way that economic interests lobby governments to produce policies favorable to them, but at the expense of the general public. Interests lobby for subsidies, tax breaks, trade barriers to protect them from foreign competition, regulatory barriers to inhibit domestic competitors, and more. Over time, the connection between interest groups and policymakers strengthens, so that increasingly, profits are the result of political connections rather than producing value for consumers. The growth of interest group influence over time leads to the decline of nations.

Brennan and Lomasky build on the idea that voters know their one vote will not affect an election outcome, and conclude that therefore the utility people get from voting comes solely from the value they get from expressing their opinion. Because of this, they explain why voters may vote for alternatives they would not choose if the choice were theirs alone. They vote for options that make them feel good about casting their vote, so tend to vote more based on emotional reasons than based on what is best for themselves, or what is in the public interest. 

Caplan also builds on the observation that one vote will not affect an election outcome, so voters have little incentive to cast an informed vote. Caplan notes that people tend to have biased beliefs about public policy, leading them to vote for candidates and policies that are not in the public interest. Voters tend to be, in Caplan’s terms, rationally irrational. To examine this idea, Caplan compares the public policy views of economists with those of the general public and finds significant differences. Under the assumption that economists are correct about the public policies that best further the public interest, Caplan concludes that popular opinion often pushes public policies in a counterproductive direction.

Acemoglu and Robinson note that a productive and orderly society requires a government strong enough to protect the rights of its citizens, but that a government with sufficient power to protect people’s rights also has the potential to violate their rights and oppress its citizens. The power of government can be constrained by a strong civil society to balance that government power. Because societies are best off when the power of government is balanced by the power of civil society, there is a narrow corridor where the two are balanced. They discuss the challenges of remaining in that narrow corridor.