I’ve been drawn to philosophical inquiry for as long as I can remember (even before knowing philosophy was a thing, which I didn’t realize until after high school). My most enduring interest is in inquiry concerning rationality and irrationality. My early studies focused on the relationship between morality and rationality. My current research focuses on choice situations and preference structures that can interfere with choosing well by prompting self-defeating patterns of choice. The relevant patterns are associated with being tempted or torn and include cases of individual and collective procrastination. Though not a cure-all, understanding rationality’s guidance can, I think, highlight certain pitfalls in life and help us avoid them.
This collection revolves around the for-some-liberating-and-for-others-distressing idea that, given the plurality of things that matter in life, the options one faces might sometimes not be rankable in relation to one another as either one better than the other or as equally good; instead, they might be incomparable or else on a par.
While some think this idea requires qualification or is mistaken, others accept it and ask if or when it raises a serious challenge for choosing well. In a world rich with diverse possibilities that one can find oneself torn between, it’s natural to wonder whether rational choice between options that cannot be ranked in relation to one another is possible and, if so, how such choice proceeds.
This collection provides an influential starting point for such inquiry.
Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? In this book, some of the sharpest minds in philosophy struggle with these questions.
This collection delves into some intriguing issues regarding rationality and morality.
At its heart is an issue with roots in ancient philosophy that philosophers have been seeking to address with increasing sophistication, namely: Can one rationally and consistently undertake and follow through on a commitment that prompts one to choose an option other than the one that one favors most? Such commitment and resoluteness seem self-defeating.
Yet, a readiness to so commit and follow through is arguably essential for gaining certain otherwise unattainable opportunities and can thus be advantageous.
For some (including the philosopher whose work this collection honors), this figures as the rational basis for commitment as well as for justice, which is thought to involve a mutually advantageous readiness to show restraint with respect to pursuing preferred options.
What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers working in this field explore the controversies surrounding Gauthier's position. Several essays argue against influential conceptions of preference, while others suggest that received conceptions of rational action misidentify…
This collection explores a fascinating and currently highly relevant puzzle concerning cases in which the contribution of a single individual will not make the difference between success and failure with respect to a certain important goal (e.g., achieving decent air quality) because the contribution (e.g., walking to the store instead of driving) is too insignificant given the scale of the goal.
In such cases, it might seem not only tempting but permissible or even required that the individual refrain from contributing and instead spend her energy and resources in some more effective way (so as to actually make a difference with respect to some morally or rationally important goal).
Yet, if all reason in this way and refrain from contributing, the important collective goal will not be achieved at all.
The papers collected here represent the most recent work on a much neglected problem in practical reasoning. It is the problem of imperceptible harms and benefits. It is perhaps better to characterize the problem as a collection of puzzles or paradoxes, since those who deny the existence (or possibility) of imperceptible decrements (or increments) face problems no less perplexing than those who affinn their existence. The puzzles and paradoxes combine very practical and pressing worries about our obligations to relieve starvation, mitigate suffering and conserve resources, with deep metaethical worries about the nature of practical rationality. I use these brief…
This collection advances philosophical debate regarding the theoretically interesting and practically important topic of weakness of will.
Weakness of will is traditionally understood as involving, roughly speaking, giving into temptation by freely acting against one’s better judgment. It is widely viewed as irrational, but some theorists question whether it is really possible to freely act against one’s better judgment, and they provide alternative explanations of what appear to be instances of weakness of will or alternative ways of understanding what is going on in the cases of interest.
Look to this collection for illuminating discussions regarding weakness of will in relation to, among other things, compulsion, irresoluteness, internal fragmentation, and emotional sensitivity to value.
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as…
This collection considers an array of important issues associated with choice over time, both theoretical and practical.
Some highlights include: enlightening and nuanced discussion of the idea that we discount future benefits in a way that leads to fragmentation and predictable failures to follow through on prudent plans; the application of theoretical models of choice toward illuminating phenomena such as addiction and savings behavior; and insights regarding the nature of self-control.
Notably, this is an interdisciplinary volume in which philosophical arguments are intertwined with psychological, economic, and experimental research—an approach that I find extremely fruitful and that highlights that powerful philosophical arguments are not limited to the works of self-proclaimed philosophers.
Many of our most urgent national problems suggest a widespread lack of concern for the future. Alarming economic conditions, such as low national savings rates, declining corporate investment in long-term capital projects, and ballooning private and public debt are matched by such social ills as diminished educational achievement, environmental degradation, and high rates of infant mortality, crime, and teenage pregnancy. At the heart of all these troubles lies an important behavioral phenomenon: in the role of consumer, manager, voter, student, or parent, many Americans choose inferior but immediate rewards over greater long-term benefits. Choice Over Time offers a rich sampling…
Few, if any, of us are complete strangers to the at least occasional frustration of having proceeded in a way that was self-defeating. My book focuses on how challenging choice situations and messy preference structures can lead to self-defeating patterns of choice over time. The relevant patterns are associated with being tempted or torn and include cases of procrastination. Theories of rational choice often dismiss or abstract away from the sort of messiness that I focus on. They assume that rational agents can and should have neat preferences over their options; but, given the complexity of life, this assumption is problematic. Ultimately, I show that rationality can validate certain messy or ‘disorderly’ preference structures while also protecting us from self-defeating patterns of choice.
So many books, so little time! If you're a nonfiction fan, this field guide may help you make better choices about what to read.
Just like a field guide helps you identify plants or birds, this book helps you navigate the rich world of nonfiction. You’ll uncover how your favorite authors break down complex topics, keep you hooked, and forge those deep, personal connections that make their work unforgettable.
Practice spotting techniques "in the wild" and track your responses in the Field Notes. Record your own preferences and favorites in the Field Observations. With this guide by your side, you'll…
Attention nonfiction book lovers, this guide is for you!
If your nightstand is stacked with histories or essays, how-to guides or science books, The Curious Reader’s Field Guide to Nonfiction is going to be your new favorite companion.
Just like a field guide helps you identify plants or birds, this book helps you navigate the rich world of nonfiction. You’ll uncover how your favorite authors break down complex topics, keep you hooked, and forge those deep, personal connections that make their work unforgettable.
More than just a guide—a reading companion
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