Here are 41 books that Classics in Game Theory fans have personally recommended if you like
Classics in Game Theory.
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I grew up listening and participating in discussions about politics. These discussions often ended up on Economics – after all, “it’s the economy, stupid!”. Game theory, by being very broad and focused on strategic interactions, served as a very rewarding unifying apparatus for my understanding of Economics. It is also very beautiful and elegant, combining the austere beauty of pure mathematics with insights from elegant literature – I was pleased to cite Graham Green’s Our Man in Havana in a recent paper. It has accompanied me in a 20-year career since my PhD in Economics at the University of Minnesota to my current professorship in Economics at the University of Surrey.
When the goal is to have an appealing introduction to game theory, with plenty of economic applications, there can hardly be any book better than this one.
It covers the core elements of game theory in a simple, yet careful, way, always illustrating them with expertly chosen economic problems. A must for anyone wanting to enter the world of game theory.
This book's introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience - not only those who will specialize as pure game theorists but also those who will construct (or even just consume) game-theoretic models in applied fields of economics.
I grew up listening and participating in discussions about politics. These discussions often ended up on Economics – after all, “it’s the economy, stupid!”. Game theory, by being very broad and focused on strategic interactions, served as a very rewarding unifying apparatus for my understanding of Economics. It is also very beautiful and elegant, combining the austere beauty of pure mathematics with insights from elegant literature – I was pleased to cite Graham Green’s Our Man in Havana in a recent paper. It has accompanied me in a 20-year career since my PhD in Economics at the University of Minnesota to my current professorship in Economics at the University of Surrey.
This book is a great advanced textbook on game theory by two leading researchers on the field.
It describes the core elements of game theory in a formal and clear way, it has everything you want to know about it. It is the reference for those who want to learn game theory at an advanced level.
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many…
I grew up listening and participating in discussions about politics. These discussions often ended up on Economics – after all, “it’s the economy, stupid!”. Game theory, by being very broad and focused on strategic interactions, served as a very rewarding unifying apparatus for my understanding of Economics. It is also very beautiful and elegant, combining the austere beauty of pure mathematics with insights from elegant literature – I was pleased to cite Graham Green’s Our Man in Havana in a recent paper. It has accompanied me in a 20-year career since my PhD in Economics at the University of Minnesota to my current professorship in Economics at the University of Surrey.
An excellent textbook on game theory which is unashamedly advanced: no shortcut is taken, no distractions, no simplifications, rather it goes straight to the point and all the details are there.
It is a great book for researchers to learn the important topics in game theory and its fine details.
I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to…
I grew up listening and participating in discussions about politics. These discussions often ended up on Economics – after all, “it’s the economy, stupid!”. Game theory, by being very broad and focused on strategic interactions, served as a very rewarding unifying apparatus for my understanding of Economics. It is also very beautiful and elegant, combining the austere beauty of pure mathematics with insights from elegant literature – I was pleased to cite Graham Green’s Our Man in Havana in a recent paper. It has accompanied me in a 20-year career since my PhD in Economics at the University of Minnesota to my current professorship in Economics at the University of Surrey.
Game theory has specialized in several topics; one of my favorites and one of the most important ones is repeated games since they describe and analyze the sort of ongoing relationships that most of us experience.
This book has it all: great examples and motivation, detailed and formal presentation of a very broad set of results.
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and…
I’m a leading expert in how your mental game impacts performance. For over a decade I’ve coached hundreds of poker players, including some of the best players in the world. My clients include numerous bracelet winners at the World Series of Poker, and winners of other major titles. I have a passion for helping players become great, and many of them have climbed the ranks to become among of the best in the world. Whatever you aspire to in poker, whether it’s making some money off your friends or competing in the WSOP, be sure to pick up the books I’ve recommended—they can make a big difference!
This book is one of the best-selling poker books of the modern era despite the author not being a household name. It is a brilliant and dense primer on poker math with the amateur in mind. Other poker math books have arguably been written with a more expert tone, but this one is ideal for a beginner.
More Than 150 Pages of New Material with Greatly Expanded Content and 4 New Chapters
Over 75 Carefully Devised Practice and Example Poker Hands That Are Analyzed in Great Detail
Free Enrollment into My 10-Hour Essential Poker Math eLearning Online Video Training Course
Poker Math Is Easy to LearnPoker math is a vitally important aspect of No Limit Hold’em poker. But, it's often overlooked or simply not used because many poker players fear it is too difficult to learn. I'm here to tell you it’s not. In fact, fundamental poker math…
I am a Professor of Economics at Washington State University. My research focuses on applying Game Theory and Industrial Organization models to polluting industries and other regulated markets. I analyze how firms strategically respond to environmental regulation, including their output and pricing decisions, their investments in clean technologies, and merger decisions, both under complete and incomplete information contexts.
This book is an extremely rigorous and formal presentation of Game Theory concepts to Ph.D. students.
The chapters about complete information games and repeated games are particularly superb relative to other advanced books in this field. It also offers chapters on cooperative games, which is quite uncommon in other books (both at the undergraduate and graduate levels.)
The coverage of signaling games, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, and equilibrium refinements is relatively brief compared to most other topics in the book, but the book is still great.
Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from…
I am a Professor of Economics at Washington State University. My research focuses on applying Game Theory and Industrial Organization models to polluting industries and other regulated markets. I analyze how firms strategically respond to environmental regulation, including their output and pricing decisions, their investments in clean technologies, and merger decisions, both under complete and incomplete information contexts.
This book is a short introduction to undergraduate-level Game Theory, with a special focus on basic games of complete information and contracts.
It avoids jargon, notation, or formal definitions but emphasizes economic intuition and offers many examples in each chapter. Some chapters require a good math background, making the book a good fit for students who already took at least one course in algebra and calculus.
Joel Watson has refined his successful text to make it even more student-friendly. A number of sections have been added, and numerous chapters have been substantially revised. Dozens of new exercises have been added, along with solutions to selected exercises. Chapters are short and focused, with just the right amount of mathematical content and end-of-chapter exercises. New passages walk students through tricky topics.
I am a Professor of Economics at Washington State University. My research focuses on applying Game Theory and Industrial Organization models to polluting industries and other regulated markets. I analyze how firms strategically respond to environmental regulation, including their output and pricing decisions, their investments in clean technologies, and merger decisions, both under complete and incomplete information contexts.
An excellent game theory book for graduate students, especially for Master's students taking second-year elective courses on game theory, and even technical enough for the first-year Ph.D. Microeconomics course (since most schools spend most of the second semester covering game theory, contract theory, and applications.)
Rigorous, with detailed definitions and notation, yet accessible to senior undergraduate students at top schools (with a strong math background) or Master's students.
This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for…
As a boy, I wanted to play baseball professionally. But, alas, talent was not within me, and I became one of the few people in the world who chose physics as a career because something else was too hard. Part of my career as a scientist is learning new things; another part is teaching and, hopefully, imbuing students with a love of science. The sports science books here all taught me a great deal, and I have recommended them to several of my students. Sports can be an excellent vehicle for learning some science, and such learning about a sport one loves can make watching the sport even more fun.
How could I be a sports physicist and know next to nothing about soccer, the world’s most popular sport? After a student wanted to research soccer physics with me, I knew I had to get up to speed on the beautiful game. Wesson’s book was my choice, and it was a smart choice! From the simple, like the bounce of the ball, to the complex, like the flight of the ball during a free kick, Wesson touches on all the important aspects of soccer.
Anyone can read the book, and for those of us who yearn for the mathematical details, Wesson’s last chapter does not disappoint.
Updated and revised throughout, this new edition of The Science of Soccer applies scientific analysis to football, giving us the answers to questions like "what's the chance of a team that wins the Premiership also winning the Cup? Can you predict how many goals will be scored? What's the best height for footballers? Is the team that wins the league the best team?"
Starting with a qualitative description of the basic physics that relate to the ball and its bounce, the author then moves through kicks and throws, to a simple account of the more complex physics of a ball…
I first got interested in how markets really work when I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on the “deregulation” movement in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. I quickly discovered that deregulation never happened in the literal sense. In most cases, governments had to increase regulation to enhance market competition. They needed more rules to get “freer” markets. This sounds paradoxical at first, but it really isn’t. It makes perfect sense once you realize that markets do not arise spontaneously but rather are crafted by the very visible hand of the government. So I took that insight and I have been running with it ever since.
McMillan offers a highly readable and concise book on how economists understand market institutions.
I love to assign this book to my undergraduate students because McMillan makes sense of some fairly complex topics, such as auction design. And he covers a wide range of topics of current interest, such as corporate governance and intellectual property rights.
From the wild swings of the stock market to the online auctions of eBay to the unexpected twists of the world's post-Communist economies, markets have suddenly become quite visible. We now have occasion to ask, "What makes these institutions work? How important are they? How can we improve them?"
Taking us on a lively tour of a world we once took for granted, John McMillan offers examples ranging from a camel trading fair in India to the $20 million per day Aalsmeer flower market in the Netherlands to the global trade in AIDS drugs. Eschewing ideology, he shows us that…
