The best books on the genesis of the “second" Cold War

This well-researched book, using prime sources, is an objective and important history. It explains why Washington failed to forge a new European security order in working with Moscow at the end of the “first” Cold War.

Sarotte examines the question as to why Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to be promised by then-US Secretary of State James Baker (and other Western officials) that NATO membership would not expand beyond East Germany at the time of German unification. Just as importantly, Sarotte’s book examines why the US-proposed “Partnership for Peace”―which could have helped to establish a new system of security for eastern European states with Russian cooperation, in my view―was not pursued.

Instead, as I had argued in Dangerous Crossroads, Clinton opted to pursue the NATO “Self-Limitation”  approach (no troops, no nuclear weapons), knowing full well that both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin had warned that NATO’s expansion without strong Russian input would still cause a dangerous Russian backlash.

This is a unique book that, based on Greek tragedy, develops a deeper, philosophical understanding of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, with an eye toward conflict resolution.

In closely examining that conflict, with Russian language sources, and from a historical and rare socio-cultural-linguistic perspective, Petro’s book shows how an essentially local/regional dispute over the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine has helped to generate a horrific conflict. 

Given the fact that most books on the “second” Cold War examine the conflict from an international perspective, this book shows how a “local” dispute has blossomed into a “globalizing” conflict.

I like this book because Cohen writes about what happened and what could have happened―if Washington had chosen alternative foreign policies in its relations with the former Soviet Union and Russia. As I argued in Surviving the Millennium, this kind of approach is not “counter-factual” because it explores realistic policy alternatives made at the time that represent the paths not taken.

But sometimes, those alternative paths are actually implemented later in new circumstances, so they are part of the historical record and not “counter” the facts. I believe Cohen is right: The US lost a number of opportunities that could have brought Washington and Moscow into a more positive relationship that would have reduced tensions during the Cold War―and now in preventing the present “second” Cold War.

Sakwa’s book represents an excellent and well-written discussion of the historical reasons why the US lost peace in the aftermath of the “first” Cold War. Sakwa’s critique deals with the geostrategic and political-economic issues that have led Russia and China to challenge US global hegemony.

He examines why Moscow opposed US policy toward Ukraine (before the 2022 invasion), European policies, the new arms race, and the history of the Russian turn to Eurasianism. Sakwa likewise discusses why Moscow and Beijing forged a much tighter defense and political-economic relationship during the “second” Cold War.

Gilbert Achcar has written one of the most complete recent studies from a global geostrategic and political-economic perspective. It explains the genesis of the “Second” Cold War between the US, Russia, and China, which stemmed in large part from the NATO air war “over” Kosovo with Serbia in 1999, which alienated both Moscow and Beijing.

Much as I have likewise warned in my later books, a major power war could be provoked by the Ukraine-Russia war since 2022 or by perceived Chinese threats to unify with Taiwan, among other conflicts―if diplomacy cannot achieve peace.