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Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World Paperback – August 11, 2015
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- Print length256 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherOneworld Publications
- Publication dateAugust 11, 2015
- Dimensions5.3 x 0.9 x 8.5 inches
- ISBN-101780747411
- ISBN-13978-1780747415
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- Publisher : Oneworld Publications; Second edition (August 11, 2015)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 256 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1780747411
- ISBN-13 : 978-1780747415
- Item Weight : 9.6 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.3 x 0.9 x 8.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #884,521 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,323 in Economic Conditions (Books)
- #1,442 in History of Civilization & Culture
- #1,791 in Economic History (Books)
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Yes, I read the first and second editions, and skimmed the third. The book is worth rereading.
Crone was a powerful intellectual personality and this is a personal summing up (no footnotes!) of how the pre-industrial world worked, how it differs from the world we are accustomed to. By “pre-industrial” she means before industry but after hunting-gathering. People have settled down and are growing most of their food. The book is information dense, some times witty, a little sarcastic. Ranging across the globe, it is an amazing piece of work.
The first six chapters are about the pre-industrial world. Crone bases much of her analysis on the economic/technological constraints of pre-industrial life. Scarcity is at the base of everything.
The seventh is more generally about religion. Crone’s explanation is along the lines of functionalist sociology. Religion provides justification for the way society is set up. It also provides “oughts”–what is right and wrong. People cannot live without believing in good and bad; it gives their life meaning. More modern treatments would also point to humans’ “theory of mind”: the surety that other people have minds just like we do, with consciousness, desires, frustrations, etc. Much religious feeling involves extending a theory of mind to supernatural entities or to non-human objects in this world.
Speaking of which, near the end, I was annoyed by passages like, “Human societies aim at stability; all hope to find the social and political organization best suited ...” (p, 200 3/e) Societies are not conscious entities that aim or hope. Such “reification” misleads more than it illuminates.
Back in the 1980s, the sea that most intellectuals swam in was still some version of Rousseau and Freud: humans are built to be free of social ties, and now that we live in societies, we are forced to frustrate our true desires. Yet it is now clear that we evolved in social groups and are indeed “built” for some version thereof. (Crone does pull away from the tradition a bit, offering that humans’ genetic “instructions ... clearly make them gregarious”. She sums up, “In so far as human societies have a ‘base’, it is constituted by the interaction between natural environment, genetic equipment and symbolic culture” (p. 166 3/e), though she doesn’t inquire what that genetic equipment is.)
In the last two chapters, she attempts to bring things up to date. Her thesis: Everywhere in the world but Europe, pre-industrial societies had developed which would bend but not break. Economy, government, culture, and religion fit together with a dynamic stability. China is her great example. Increasing population, higher agricultural productivity, a substantial amount of manufacturing, even the great Malthusian famines of the 1850s only rattled the foundations of the system. But early industry broke Europe’s system.
Crone believed that outside Europe industrialization is impossible unless “the authorities ... assume dictatorial powers” to break the system themselves. (p. 213 3/e) We now have three more decades of experience which suggest that the reality is, um, more complex.
I was somewhat disappointed by this part. For one thing, there is a too narrow logic of modernity: In a modern society, she says, nothing is beyond questioning. Researchers must be able to investigate anything they want. There must be no ascriptive status. Race and sex, among other things, must not matter. The twenty first century isn’t starting out that way (and some of her additions seem to indicate the beginning of a rethinking).
For another thing, it seemed more about why Europe COULD industrialize than why it DID (and, of course, until WW I, a good deal of Europe wasn’t industrialized). Since 1989, there has been a tremendous amount of work on why there was an industrial revolution. Jack Goldstone’s Why Europe? was his answer in 2007. Diedre McCloskey’s 2016 Bourgeois Equality is a long argument that widespread prosperity was impossible until it became honorable to engage in (honest) manufacturing and trade. Ian Morris’ 2011 Why the West Rules–For Now is an attempt to tie together the last 6,000 years or so. Recent research even suggests that the Catholic Church’s prohibition of cousin marriage helped by reducing “tribalism”.
When we think about the past, whether about our national heritage or about the historical past, we usually project onto it our contemporary assumptions about how things work. These assumptions spring from our experience of modernity--vast wealth; vast technological capabilities to shape our world; vast and pervasive power of the state; ample food supply being taken for granted, at least in the first world; 2% of the population involved in food production instead of upwards of 80%; an integrated culture such that farmers in remote corners of the country are watching the same movies and TV shows and listening to the same music as people in Manhattan; integrated economy, such that farms are no longer self supporting even in the realm of food production, but rather produce a single crop for market and buy their food at the grocery store like everyone else; social homogenization across vast spaces such that Californians, Floridians, and Mainers all think of themselves as Americans rather than identifying with the local culture.
When we try to imagine the world view and life world of people as close to us in time as Washington and Jefferson--let alone Alexander the Great, Muhammad, or Charlemagne--we have to think all of this away. This is very difficult because modernity seems as natural to us as the air we breathe. Crone's book is a very useful extended thought experiment that makes it possible to do just this. It is a bit polemical at times--but that is just Crone.
Crone concludes with 2 quite interesting chapters on the distinctiveness of European societies and what constitutes modernity. The role of interstate competition and fundamental conflicts between the Classical and Christian intellectual traditions are emphasized in the discussion of why Europe generated industrialization. While Crone doesn't mention this, the latter idea was suggested decades ago by the British historian GN Clark. Her discussion of the features of the modern world is similarly insightful. Crone is a good writer with a talent for telling phrases. There is a good suggested reading list.
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Like Gaul, it is divided into three parts.
The first two-thirds deal with the subject matter of the title. It doesn’t, nor does it claim to, deal with all pre-industrial societies it deals with societies that were ‘pre-industrial of the civilized kind’, in other words the kinds of societies that the majority of people have lived in since before recorded history and up to about two centuries ago. (SJWs – whom I would urge to read this in order to gain some understanding of the planet they live on – be warned, this book includes words like ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’). Basically if your society (the Inca excepted) didn’t have writing you’re not included in this survey.
As an introduction the author asks the readers to imagine themselves as part of a group of castaways on a desert island and how we would construct a working society. The more of us there are, the more complex the society will be. She then points out that this thought experiment can only bring us so far in imagining the origins of societies as it leaves out the vital component of religion.
The main text is taken up with chapters on ‘Socio-Economic Organization’, ‘The State’, ‘Politics’, ‘Culture’ (in 15th century Korea King Seijong tried to democratise learning by introducing an alphabet in place of the thousands of Chinese characters but his best efforts were defeated by scholars opposed to ‘vulgar letters’), ‘Society and the Individual’ (in 15th century Siam everybody below the king was awarded ‘dignity marks’ ranging from 5 for a slave to 100,00 for the heir apparent, the king’s dignity being infinite), and ‘Religion’.
The last third of the book is taken up with two chapters, one on ‘The Oddity of Europe’ and the other on ‘Modernity’.
The first of these, is, based on recommendations of authors I admire, why I bought this book to read. Here she addresses the question of the rise of the West and whether the West was merely the first or a freak. She thinks it was a freak and ascribes its rise to, inter alia, the weakness of its state system (unlike Chinese emperors Western rulers had to bargain with subjects and popes), the composite nature of its culture (here she makes interesting comparisons with Japan) and the opportunities Europe’s wealth and European population control provided.
There are areas where I felt more could have been written.
For instance she touches on the difference between shame and guilt but could – and to my mind should – have written more on this topic particularly as it gives an insight into one of the causes of friction arising out of mass migration from shame-based third world countries to guilt-based Western ones. There are reasons for honour killings.
In the chapter on Europe a little over a page is given over to scientific thought. This is far too little as the Scientific Revolution preceded the Industrial one and, as Ed Wilson pointed out, “Science isn't easy; that's why it took so long to get started, and then mostly in one place, western Europe.”
In her coverage of scientific thought she starts well and makes the very interesting point that South-East Asia had a mixture of the Buddhist religion and a Hindu high culture mixed with assorted native legacies without producing science or the rise of a bourgeoisie (The West being a composite of barbarian invaders, Christianity, and Graeco-Roman high culture, which did produce both). But the rest of the section fizzles out with one long paragraph about Classical deductive thought and Protestant inductive reasoning.
I also get the impression that, in dealing with ‘The Oddity of Europe’, the author goes out of her way to downplay the conscious contribution of Europeans e.g. that medieval Latin Christendom gave birth to the university. Similarly I think the role of individual Catholic churchmen is downplayed e.g. the influence of Thomas Aquinas is overlooked.
Nor does she properly address the importance of the fact that Latin West made far more use of the legacy of the legacy of Golden Age Greece than either the Greek speaking East or – in the long run – the Islamic world.
The closing chapter on modernity is also worth reading and helps explain why some societies find it easier than others to adapt to the modern world.
Unlike a lot of social science writing this one is written in plain – if bland – English that a layperson like me can follow easily. It contains a useful Further Reading list.
This review is based on the third edition, produced shortly before the author’s death.