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Free Market Fairness Kindle Edition
A provocative new vision of free market capitalism that achieves liberal ends by libertarian means
Can libertarians care about social justice? In Free Market Fairness, John Tomasi argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, Tomasi presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, Tomasi argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, he encourages egalitarians concerned about social justice to listen more sympathetically to the claims ordinary citizens make about the importance of private economic liberty in their daily lives. In place of the familiar social democratic interpretations of social justice, Tomasi offers a "market democratic" conception of social justice: free market fairness. Tomasi argues that free market fairness, with its twin commitment to economic liberty and a fair distribution of goods and opportunities, is a morally superior account of liberal justice. Free market fairness is also a distinctively American ideal. It extends the notion, prominent in America's founding period, that protection of property and promotion of real opportunity are indivisible goals. Indeed, according to Tomasi, free market fairness is social justice, American style.
Provocative and vigorously argued, Free Market Fairness offers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice—one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPrinceton University Press
- Publication dateFebruary 26, 2012
- File size1377 KB
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Editorial Reviews
Review
In many respects, [Tomasi] is a classical liberal, but he also retains a strong commitment to the worst off in society. He is a supporter of both free-market capitalism and of safety nets. His goal is to combine economic liberty and social justice. In attempting to transcend the standard positions, he should be commended. (Daniel Ben-Ami Spiked Review of Books )
Brilliant. . . . The heart of Tomasi's book entails serious engagement with John Rawls and his liberal theory of justice as fairness. (Ryan T. Anderson Weekly Standard )
Tomasi takes a significant step beyond classical and some types of social democratic liberalism in an attempt to find common ground. . . . Tomasi's 'market democracy' contributes important insight to the continuing political-economic debate. (Choice )
Free Market Fairness is a fine book that merits promotion, a merit raise, a cohort of graduate students, a fine reputation, and all the other benefits of academic life. The book is well written and well researched. The arguments are clearly stated and well defended. Political thinkers of all stripes will benefit from Tomasi's discussion of classical liberalism and libertarianism. (Mark A. Graber Review of Politics )
Tomasi is a useful corrective to both Rawls and Hayek. (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews )
One could hardly imagine John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness coming along at a more opportune time. Stump-speech rhetoric seems to have turned its attention (at least nominally) towards the concept of fairness. . . . The proper role of government is up for debate again. . . . Tomasi offers a clear-headed exploration of these and other issues during a moment of noticeable obtuseness and obfuscation in American politics [as] an accident of timing, incidental to his larger project, which is both ambitious and deeply needed. (Robert Herritt Policy Review )
[Free Market Fairness's] aim is to question opposed modes of thought and find a way between them. Saying that his book was written for 'ideologically uncommitted readers,' Mr. Tomasi invites them and others to join him in exploring the ideas he has outlined. It is an invitation well worth accepting, especially in an election year. (Adam Wolfson Wall Street Journal )
An extremely interesting and important project. (Ethics )
John Tomasi has written a spirited, accessible book that successfully argues the classical liberal tradition . . . of private economic liberty as a necessary and equal partner with social and political liberties in a free and just democratic society. This integrated, constructive approach . . . also recognizes the importance of social justice, a high liberal concept that he redefines by employing the principles of classical liberal thought. . . . Tomasi has provided the intellectual and justificatory framework for classical liberal adherents to robustly explore opportunities in a market-democracy research program. (Thomas A. Hemphill Journal of Markets and Morality )
Review
"Tomasi's 'market democracy' is a fresh, important research program."―Elizabeth Anderson, University of Michigan
"The great political power of free market ideas in recent decades has been unmatched by philosophical and moral defenses. John Tomasi's fresh exploration of market liberty will challenge orthodoxies left and right. An important and timely book."―Stephen Macedo, Princeton University
"This is one of the very best philosophical treatments of libertarian thought, ever. John Tomasi cements his position as one of America's leading social and political philosophers."―Tyler Cowen, author of Creative Destruction
"This book represents the most ambitious recent effort by a political philosopher to square the circle: free markets and fairness. Even readers who disagree with Tomasi's conclusions will find insight and clarity on every page."―Richard Epstein, New York University
"Tomasi's elegant book resembles a long and friendly conversation between Friedrich Hayek and John Rawls―a conversation which, astonishingly, reaches agreement."―Deirdre McCloskey, author of Bourgeois Dignity and The Bourgeois Virtues
"Tomasi is sympathetic to, and captures much of the point of, positions to the right of his, and positions to the left. The result is disarming and genuine. Readers will find themselves turning the pages, hoping not so much to spot the flaw as simply to learn something, and they will not be disappointed."―David Schmidtz, University of Arizona
"This book makes a case that needed making and that will have a large impact on contemporary thinking about social justice."―Michael Zuckert, University of Notre Dame
"Hayekian freedom and Rawlsian social justice both evoke attractive visions of how human beings might live together―something seldom acknowledged in our polarized political world. John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness treats both traditions with depth, nuance, and unremitting fair-mindedness, and then points us toward a synthesis. Social democrats and libertarians equally need to read this book."―Charles Murray, American Enterprise Institute
"Political philosophers are apt to dig in to carefully constructed ideological bunkers from which they lob argumentative mortar shells at their opponents. John Tomasi prefers instead to build bridges. Well-crafted and provocative, Free Market Fairness will surely stimulate much conversation―and perhaps a few mortar rounds in response."―Loren Lomasky, University of Virginia
"This is a terrific book―lively, stimulating, novel, and important. Written with clarity and lightness, it is appealingly wide-ranging, spanning political philosophy, intellectual history, and more. It will be widely read and cited."―Jacob T. Levy, McGill University
From the Inside Flap
"This book provides an original defense of classical liberalism. Tomasi argues that the high liberal conception of free and equal moral persons requires robust economic liberties as a condition of individual independence and self-authorship, while also justifying social supports for the less advantaged. Free Market Fairness is an important contribution to liberal thought."--Samuel Freeman, University of Pennsylvania
"Tomasi's 'market democracy' is a fresh, important research program."--Elizabeth Anderson, University of Michigan
"The great political power of free market ideas in recent decades has been unmatched by philosophical and moral defenses. John Tomasi's fresh exploration of market liberty will challenge orthodoxies left and right. An important and timely book."--Stephen Macedo, Princeton University
"This is one of the very best philosophical treatments of libertarian thought, ever. John Tomasi cements his position as one of America's leading social and political philosophers."--Tyler Cowen, author ofCreative Destruction
"This book represents the most ambitious recent effort by a political philosopher to square the circle: free marketsand fairness. Even readers who disagree with Tomasi's conclusions will find insight and clarity on every page."--Richard Epstein, New York University
"Tomasi's elegant book resembles a long and friendly conversation between Friedrich Hayek and John Rawls--a conversation which, astonishingly, reaches agreement."--Deirdre McCloskey, author ofBourgeois Dignity and The Bourgeois Virtues
"Tomasi is sympathetic to, and captures much of the point of, positions to the right of his, and positions to the left. The result is disarming and genuine. Readers will find themselves turning the pages, hoping not so much to spot the flaw as simply to learn something, and they will not be disappointed."--David Schmidtz, University of Arizona
"This book makes a case that needed making and that will have a large impact on contemporary thinking about social justice."--Michael Zuckert, University of Notre Dame
"Hayekian freedom and Rawlsian social justice both evoke attractive visions of how human beings might live together--something seldom acknowledged in our polarized political world. John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness treats both traditions with depth, nuance, and unremitting fair-mindedness, and then points us toward a synthesis. Social democrats and libertarians equally need to read this book."--Charles Murray, American Enterprise Institute
"Political philosophers are apt to dig in to carefully constructed ideological bunkers from which they lob argumentative mortar shells at their opponents. John Tomasi prefers instead to build bridges. Well-crafted and provocative,Free Market Fairness will surely stimulate much conversation--and perhaps a few mortar rounds in response."--Loren Lomasky, University of Virginia
"This is a terrific book--lively, stimulating, novel, and important. Written with clarity and lightness, it is appealingly wide-ranging, spanning political philosophy, intellectual history, and more. It will be widely read and cited."--Jacob T. Levy, McGill University
From the Back Cover
"This book provides an original defense of classical liberalism. Tomasi argues that the high liberal conception of free and equal moral persons requires robust economic liberties as a condition of individual independence and self-authorship, while also justifying social supports for the less advantaged. Free Market Fairness is an important contribution to liberal thought."--Samuel Freeman, University of Pennsylvania
"Tomasi's 'market democracy' is a fresh, important research program."--Elizabeth Anderson, University of Michigan
"The great political power of free market ideas in recent decades has been unmatched by philosophical and moral defenses. John Tomasi's fresh exploration of market liberty will challenge orthodoxies left and right. An important and timely book."--Stephen Macedo, Princeton University
"This is one of the very best philosophical treatments of libertarian thought, ever. John Tomasi cements his position as one of America's leading social and political philosophers."--Tyler Cowen, author ofCreative Destruction
"This book represents the most ambitious recent effort by a political philosopher to square the circle: free marketsand fairness. Even readers who disagree with Tomasi's conclusions will find insight and clarity on every page."--Richard Epstein, New York University
"Tomasi's elegant book resembles a long and friendly conversation between Friedrich Hayek and John Rawls--a conversation which, astonishingly, reaches agreement."--Deirdre McCloskey, author ofBourgeois Dignity and The Bourgeois Virtues
"Tomasi is sympathetic to, and captures much of the point of, positions to the right of his, and positions to the left. The result is disarming and genuine. Readers will find themselves turning the pages, hoping not so much to spot the flaw as simply to learn something, and they will not be disappointed."--David Schmidtz, University of Arizona
"This book makes a case that needed making and that will have a large impact on contemporary thinking about social justice."--Michael Zuckert, University of Notre Dame
"Hayekian freedom and Rawlsian social justice both evoke attractive visions of how human beings might live together--something seldom acknowledged in our polarized political world. John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness treats both traditions with depth, nuance, and unremitting fair-mindedness, and then points us toward a synthesis. Social democrats and libertarians equally need to read this book."--Charles Murray, American Enterprise Institute
"Political philosophers are apt to dig in to carefully constructed ideological bunkers from which they lob argumentative mortar shells at their opponents. John Tomasi prefers instead to build bridges. Well-crafted and provocative,Free Market Fairness will surely stimulate much conversation--and perhaps a few mortar rounds in response."--Loren Lomasky, University of Virginia
"This is a terrific book--lively, stimulating, novel, and important. Written with clarity and lightness, it is appealingly wide-ranging, spanning political philosophy, intellectual history, and more. It will be widely read and cited."--Jacob T. Levy, McGill University
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Free Market Fairness
By JOHN TOMASIPRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2012 Princeton University PressAll right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-14446-7
Contents
Acknowledgments.......................................................................ixIntroduction..........................................................................xiChapter 1 Classical Liberalism.......................................................1Property and Equality.................................................................1Market Society........................................................................6America...............................................................................11Hayek.................................................................................16Classical Liberalism..................................................................22Chapter 2 High Liberalism............................................................27Property or Equality..................................................................27the decline of Economic Liberty.......................................................32Rawls.................................................................................37The Libertarian Moment................................................................46Liberalismus Sapiens Sapiens..........................................................51Chapter 3 Thinking the Unthinkable...................................................57The Great Fact: Economic Growth.......................................................57Populism, Probability, and Political Philosophy.......................................60Economic Liberty and Democratic Legitimacy............................................68Endings, and Beginnings, Too..........................................................84Chapter 4 Market Democracy...........................................................87The Conceptual Space..................................................................87Breaking Ice..........................................................................99Market democracy as a Research Program................................................103Institutions..........................................................................106The Challenges to Market Democracy....................................................118Chapter 5 Social Justicitis..........................................................123The Distributional Adequacy Condition.................................................123Hit Parade: Property and the Poor.....................................................127Hayek's Critique......................................................................142Benadryl for Free-Marketeers..........................................................151Chapter 6 Two Concepts of Fairness...................................................162Warming up to Market Democracy........................................................162Applying the Theory...................................................................172The Argument Ipse Dixit...............................................................177Justice as Fairness: Status or Agency?................................................180Chapter 7 Feasibility, Normativity, and Institutional Guarantees.....................197The Twilight of Left Liberalism?......................................................197Realistic Utopianism..................................................................203Aims and Guarantees...................................................................215Chapter 8 Free Market Fairness.......................................................226The Difference Principle..............................................................226Fair Equality of Opportunity..........................................................237Political Liberty.....................................................................247Generational, Environmental, and International Justice................................254Free Market Fairness as a Moral Ideal.................................................264Conclusion............................................................................267Notes.................................................................................273Bibliography..........................................................................315Index.................................................................................333Chapter One
Classical LiberalismProperty and Equality
Liberalism has a complicated history. If asked to draw a quick sketch, however, most contemporary theorists would find the main lines of liberal thought easy enough to depict. Liberalism passed through two great, evolutionary stages. There was an early "classical" stage that emphasized private property. It claimed that people are respected as equals if the law treats them all the same, regardless of material inequalities that might emerge between them. The classical view was eventually displaced by modern, "high" liberalism. As the masterworks of the High Renaissance represent the culmination of a creative movement begun by early Renaissance artists, so high liberals see their political view as the fulfillment of a normative ideal first discussed, but only partially understood, by classical liberal thinkers: the ideal of political equality. Thus while classical liberalism was founded on a formal conception of equality, high liberalism develops the idea of equality into a substantive moral ideal. High liberalism affirms social justice as the ultimate standard of institutional evaluation and, perhaps as a consequence, relegates private economic liberty to a secondary place. High liberalism, on this telling, is an unambiguous moral advance over the early liberal view.
If I were set to work on the task of sketching liberalism's history, my picture would also depict two great schools of thought, with the (self-described) "high liberal" school emerging after the (temporally) "classical" one. However, my picture would depict the lines of moral advancement and regression between the two schools as decidedly mixed. Along the dimension of equality, for example, my drawing would depict the substantive ideal of equality developed by high liberals as a moral improvement over the purely formal classical liberal ideal. Regarding the protection of the basic liberties of citizens, however, my drawing would depict the classical liberal respect for private economic liberty as appropriate and the high liberal neglect of such liberty as a significant moral defect. In terms of the relative moral standing of the two views, therefore, my drawing would feature big arrows pointing in opposite directions.
I discuss classical liberalism in this chapter, high liberalism in the next. While not presented quite in stick-figure terms, my account will be simple, broad stroked, and intentionally stylized. Most histories of liberalism emphasize the role of religious conflict. I mention such conflicts barely at all. This is because my aim is to describe the origins of a conflict within liberal thinking—the conflict between those who see liberalism as a doctrine of limited government power and wide individual economic freedom, and those who see it as a doctrine calling for extensive direct government involvement in the lives of citizens, most notably in economic affairs. In particular, I hope to show the power of the stage-evolutionary interpretation of liberal history that dominates contemporary academic discourse, the one that depicts the latter view as morally superior to the former one. So I shall focus on the key adaptive mechanisms that allowed the high liberal view to propagate and become widely hailed as fit. The history of ideas I provide will be interspersed with references to events within actual liberal societies. I do this in order to draw attention to a line of ambiguity that runs through this evolutionary tale: an ambiguity about the moral value of economic liberty.
As an intellectual movement, the start of the liberal revolution is usually traced to 1689, the year John Locke published his Second Treatise of Government. Locke was writing against two strong undercurrents of English social life: first, the lingering psychological eddies of feudalism, with its ideal of social order based on status and rank; second, a stream of worries springing from the recent attempts by a series of English kings to establish themselves as absolute monarchs. To appreciate Locke's contribution to liberal thought, we must first dip into those background currents.
Under the Norman system of feudalism, political power was concentrated in the person of the king. Members of other strata were connected to the king either by oaths or by station of birth. A large class of serfs could own no property. They worked the land and paid tithes to a small class of barons who, in turn, were tied by pledges of fealty to the king. Power was highly personal in nature. People experienced life not as free and equal citizens but as embedded members of hereditary groups. One's place of residence, occupation, and even the particulars of family life were typically assigned on the basis of social rank. Far from affirming equality and freedom, the feudal order was grounded on differentiation and constraint. The central function of the political system was to preserve the peace and stability of this hierarchical order.
Of course, the particulars of feudal life did not conform neatly to this idealized form. In England, there were stirrings of political freedom almost from the start of the Norman period, typically dated to Battle of Hastings in 1066. In 1101, less than fifty years after Hastings, William's son, Henry I, assented to the Charter of Liberty, which proved to be the first in a long line of such charters. These charters, the most important of which was the Magna Carta of 1215, represented a strong and building set of restraints on royal power by means of law. Secure rights of property, held against the king, were among the most important checks provided by the Magna Carta.
The Great Charters defined property rights relations between the king and barons. By extension, they also provided an early platform for the development of a system of rules governing the daily interactions of English subjects. Many of these rules, known as the common law, concerned ordinary commercial transactions. Reforms introduced by Henry II allowed the common law gradually to displace idiosyncratic customs of feudal and county courts, bringing more uniformity to the experience of English subjects. By defining rights of holding and rules of exchange, the common law carved out relatively secure areas for private interpersonal action. By securing claims to property, these precepts enabled people to better assess the risks and rewards of ventures they might consider launching with one another. Common law made the social world increasingly navigable to individuals in their everyday lives.
The main struts of the status-based legal framework of Norman feudalism remained in place during this period, though they were sinking ever lower now. Status-preserving features of that framework, such as the doctrines of primogeniture and entailment, continued to impose differential horizons on people's life-prospects. Still, through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ordinary Englishmen grew ever more accustomed to directing their own affairs and living within social structures created by their own actions. Increasingly, they saw the system of common law as a cultural inheritance. The liberties protected by common law came to be seen as the birthright of every English subject. Slowly, over centuries, changes in the circumstances of life were outpacing the dogmas of the old order.
The depth of these changes was dramatically sounded during the seventeenth century, when a series of English kings attempted to establish themselves as absolute monarchs: first James I and his son Charles I, and later James II. Under absolutism, a monarch asserts authority over all aspects of political life without any constitutional checks on his power. Claiming to hold sovereign authority directly from God, these kings asserted that none of their subjects—including those subjects who served in parliamentary bodies—had any right to limit royal power. All political authority, all land and property was by divine right vested in the person of the king, and he could grant monopoly rights and levy taxes as he saw fit.
By this time, however, the idea of the "rights of Englishmen" and the tradition of parliamentary democracy were too strongly rooted to permit the movement toward absolutism. People resented the royal monopolies and preferred a more open system of competition based on merit. Taxes levied by Charles without the consent of Parliament, in particular his infamous "ship money" scheme, met bitter opposition. The attempts by James and Charles to establish absolutist rule in England led to the English Civil Wars (1642–49), capped by the execution of Charles on January 30, 1649. A few decades later, an attempt by James II to establish an absolutist monarchy led to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, effectively ending absolutist ambitions in England.
English monarchs were now understood to hold their authority only by the consent of a representative assembly. The passage of the 1689 Bill of Rights codified these important changes. As a matter of established law, English monarchs henceforth lacked the authority to levy taxes, make appointments, or maintain a standing army except with the permission of Parliament. People had a right to petition the monarch; rights to freedom of speech and assembly were first exercised. England had become a constitutional monarchy.
Locke was writing in the period immediately downstream from these events. He was aware that many of his fellow citizens were close to accepting "the dangerous belief that 'all government in the world is merely the product of force and violence.'" By beginning his argument with an account of man's condition in the state of nature, Locke sought to present the possibility of legitimate government in a more hopeful way.
State-of-nature arguments are heuristic devices. To glimpse the true nature of persons, we filter out the culturally specific assumptions about people's stations and roles that muddy our moral vision. Considered in their natural state, Locke argued, people are born free and equal as children of God. They are free in that they need permission from no other person to act. They are equal in that there is no natural political authority of one person over another. People are also by nature needful. They must cooperatively interact with the raw, God-given bounty around them in order to fill their stomachs, shelter their bodies, and flourish as children of God. The political problem facing people was a common and public one: how might they devise a form of government appropriate to the condition of freedom, equality, and need into which people by nature find themselves?
Locke found the beginnings of an answer to this question in his doctrine of self-ownership. Owning themselves, people own their labor too. By mixing their labor with things in the world, people develop ownership relations with those things. For Locke, property is part of the natural fabric of the universe. Because some people work harder and more effectively than others, inequalities of holding are also part of that fabric. In the early stages of social development, these inequalities will be limited by the requirement that no one takes any more than they can use before it spoils. The invention of money amplifies the degree of inequality while increasing the productivity of labor. Since people accept the custom of money, they accept those greater inequalities too. On Locke's telling, the process of property acquisition that generates an increase of wealth also supports a growth in the population, even as productive land becomes scarce. To escape these "inconveniencies," Locke says people agree to establish a civil society and government.
Legitimate government must be founded on the consent of those to be governed. People who are free and equal, however, would not consent to be governed by a legal order that forced some, by birth, into lives of bondage or submission. Nor would they accept that they were born into a position of submission to a divinely appointed king. The status-based feudal system, like the claims of the absolute monarchs, had implied just that. Against these ideas, Locke insisted that governments are legitimate only when they preserve the natural freedom of all citizens, no matter their parentage or place of birth. Governments did not exist merely to enforce order. So too, government was not a device for enhancing the glory or wealth of any hereditary class, whether aristocrat or king. Political power, Locke suggested, was a public rather than a private power. The only legitimate function of government was the equal protection of the natural rights to life, liberty, and property. "The great and chief end, therefore, of Men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the Preservation of their Property."
Later writers hailed property as the institutional pivot of this new political system. David Hume, for example, set out "three fundamental laws of nature," all of which concerned the protection of economic liberty. Those laws protected the "stability of possession," the free transfer of property by consent, and a guarantee that promises and contracts be performed. Hume saw the protection of economic freedom as fundamental to the welfare of society as a whole. He wrote: "Tis on the strict observance of those three laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend; nor is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among men, where these are neglected. Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the support of society." Property supports society and human well-being.
The contrast with the feudal and absolutist conceptions of social order is stark. Those schemes see social order as something that must be imposed from the top down onto society. By contrast, the development of a relatively autonomous economic sphere opens the possibility of more complex social orders. With a secure system of property rights, individuals and associations are free to interact peacefully in pursuit of diverse goals and ideals. Rather than being a product of conscious control, social order emerges spontaneously from the cooperation and competition of ordinary citizens.
Market Society
If Locke provided the moral foundations for liberalism, Adam Smith explained the feature of this new political order that was most radical and, to many, most mysterious. If economic life were freed from direct political control, Smith explained, the result would be prosperity at a level hitherto unimagined. Throughout the medieval era, prices of goods and services were set with an eye to doing justice—at least, justice in the eyes of those in positions of privilege. Local leaders and church authorities had substantial power to set the prices at which commodities could be bought and sold. Laws against usury allowed the Church and a small number of politically connected bankers to earn monopoly rents. Under absolutism the monarch claimed the authority, in principle at least, to be able to determine the distribution of goods and opportunities across the society.
The quasi-market system that had slowly emerged increasingly freed prices from direct political control and instead matched supply to demand. Smith described key mechanisms that made this motor run—the principle of the division of labor, for example. Most important for our purposes, Smith suggested that this system of free, unplanned pricing might work in a way that created general prosperity. By separating the economic and political spheres, the new order sought to break up the old systems of patronage and concentrated power. It brought reforms allowing individuals and associations to control their destinies in economic affairs and thus determine the shape of their own lives.
According to what Smith called "the system of natural liberty," governmental activity should be limited to three areas: national defense, the provision of a limited range of public goods, and the exact administration of justice. It is the conception of justice that most strikingly differentiated this new system of liberty from the system of royal patronage it sought to displace. As with Locke, the essence of this emerging "liberal" program lay in the idea that the purpose of the state is to protect the freedom of citizens equally. The proper way for the state to accomplish this goal is to limit the range of its own activities.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Free Market Fairnessby JOHN TOMASI Copyright © 2012 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Product details
- ASIN : B0073X0IHC
- Publisher : Princeton University Press (February 26, 2012)
- Publication date : February 26, 2012
- Language : English
- File size : 1377 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 381 pages
- Page numbers source ISBN : 0691158142
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,554,904 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #257 in Environmental Economics (Kindle Store)
- #382 in Free Enterprise
- #842 in Economic Theory (Kindle Store)
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About the author
John Tomasi is Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Brown University, where he has twice been awarded University prizes for excellence in undergraduate teaching. He is the founding director of The Political Theory Project, an independent research center at Brown that supports scholarship and encourages political dialogue on campus.
Tomasi did his graduate work in political philosophy at the University of Arizona (M.A.) and Oxford University (B.Phil., D.Phil.). He has held positions at The University Center for Human Values at Princeton, the Department of Philosophy at Stanford, the Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard, and the Freedom Center at the University of Arizona.
In addition to numerous scholarly articles, Tomasi is the author of Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society and the Boundaries of Political Theory (Princeton University Press, 2001) and Free Market Fairness (Princeton University Press, 2012).
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The book starts with a discussion of the history of liberal thought and its three main strands of classical liberalism, libertarianism, and high liberalism (which I would prefer to call progressivism, but whatever). This history alone is worth reading. It's remarkably fair and charitable to all sides, and it sets the syncretic stage for the rest of the book.
Tomasi's basic idea is simple. Economic work is a dimension along which many individuals pursue self-development and find meaning in their lives. Given this, thick economic liberty should be protected to the same degree as other basic liberties. This includes strong property rights (including of the means of production), respect of and enforcement of economic contracts, low regulation, and low taxes.
Just as free speech and other basic liberties aren't absolute, neither are economic liberties. They can be overridden, but the justification to do so must be strong and cast in terms of protecting other basic liberties. Tomasi argues that such a regime of "market democracy" can satisfy John Rawls's difference principle, whereby (at the level of ideal theory) only those institutions should be chosen that are likely to benefit the least advantaged members of society. Market democracy satisfies the difference principle given the economic growth it encourages. Indeed it probably satisfies the difference principle better than Rawls's own preferred regimes of property-owning democracy or "liberal socialism".
Most of this argument is directed at high liberals. But for his project to succeed Tomasi also must persuade libertarians and classical liberals that social justice is both coherent and defensible. To this end he gives a long discussion of what he calls the "distributional adequacy condition" that he argues many libertarians and classical liberals implicitly defend (or at least acknowledge the moral salience of) even if they explicitly reject social justice. This discussion involves a delightful who's who of thinkers in these traditions, including most prominently a heterodox social justice interpretation of Hayek, who, Tomasi shows, not only endorses a number of institutions aimed at protecting society's worst off, but also employs an objectivity device similar to Rawls's veil of ignorance. Namely, Hayek contends when thinking about institutions, we should ask ourselves where we would want our children to grow up if we had no idea what social class they would be born into. Tomasi makes a good case that many of these thinkers, in light of their own substantive arguments, have more of an allergic reaction to social justice (when well-defined) than they do principled objections.
In an especially illuminating section on Hayek, Tomasi discussed the Austrian's concepts of cosmos (emergent order) and taxis (order of intentional design). These two kinds of order are conceptually distinct, but they shouldn't be seen as either/or. Taxitic and cosmoic orders coexist in nested structures. Firms obviously have a purpose, but they exist within the more cosmoic order of the market.
Tomasi gives the example of tweaking the boundary conditions of a sugar solution to create rock candy. The sugar and water molecules aren't individually directed; they just follow the physical forces comprising solution chemistry. The crystallization is a spontaneous process, but the macroscopic characteristics of the rock candy were determined by human design. The cosmoic order is used instrumentally for human purposes. Another example would be the methods of gardening. In the same way, the rules of a constitutional or market order can and should be tweaked for human purposes, namely social justice.
"When considering any social system as a whole, cosmos and purpose, far from being opposites or antagonists, go together. In the social setting, spontaneous orders seem positively to require such normative evaluations: evaluations, that is, in terms of social justice."
A more provocative way to put what Tomasi gives us in this book is a Rawlsian libertarianism. I over simply here, but Tomasi essentially takes the core premises of Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness and uses it to defend a kind of libertarianism. Or rather, he argues that a proper understanding of what is required by justice as fairness and the moral premises behind it is best realized in a regime that thoroughly protects economic liberty (alongside—and for similar reasons—political liberty). Further, the demands of social justice are best met under such a system as well.
Whatever you might ultimately think about the overall argument (and I remain skeptical though sympathetic), you have to give Tomasi credit for engaging in this huge revisionary project. At worst, it is an engaging and enlightening exercise to see what might happen if you accept Rawlsian starting points but add to it the moral importance of economic liberty. It’s an interesting way to learn about and further one’s understanding of Rawls (as well as economic liberty). At best, Tomasi has put forward a program the reunites the divided liberal house and sets it a more solid moral foundation.
Ultimately, I don’t think Tomasi’s project is successful on the latter account. This is because I do not think the moral foundations upon which the project is based are the correct ones. Nevertheless, the book is worth a read by anyone interested in liberty or justice. If you more libertarian minded, you will get a presentation of the modern liberal point of view that is fair, charitable, and clear. This better prepares you to understand the philosophical viewpoint that you are up against without misrepresentation or oversimplification. If you more in the Rawlsian vein, you ought to read it because it will challenge many of the ways you might think about justice as fairness and related ideas. Either way, you may not come to agree with Tomasi but you will most certainly learn something.