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The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate Paperback – September 10, 2013

4.4 4.4 out of 5 stars 1,416 ratings

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NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER • In this “ambitious and challenging” (The New York Review of Books) work, the bestselling author of Monsoon and Balkan Ghosts offers a revelatory prism through which to view global upheavals and to understand what lies ahead for continents and countries around the world.

In
The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan builds on the insights, discoveries, and theories of great geographers and geopolitical thinkers of the near and distant past to look back at critical pivots in history and then to look forward at the evolving global scene. Kaplan traces the history of the world’s hot spots by examining their climates, topographies, and proximities to other embattled lands. The Russian steppe’s pitiless climate and limited vegetation bred hard and cruel men bent on destruction, for example, while Nazi geopoliticians distorted geopolitics entirely, calculating that space on the globe used by the British Empire and the Soviet Union could be swallowed by a greater German homeland.

Kaplan then applies the lessons learned to the present crises in Europe, Russia, China, the Indian subcontinent, Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Middle East. The result is a holistic interpretation of the next cycle of conflict throughout Eurasia. Remarkably, the future can be understood in the context of temperature, land allotment, and other physical certainties: China, able to feed only 23 percent of its people from land that is only 7 percent arable, has sought energy, minerals, and metals from such brutal regimes as Burma, Iran, and Zimbabwe, putting it in moral conflict with the United States. Afghanistan’s porous borders will keep it the principal invasion route into India, and a vital rear base for Pakistan, India’s main enemy. Iran will exploit the advantage of being the only country that straddles both energy-producing areas of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Finally, Kaplan posits that the United States might rue engaging in far-flung conflicts with Iraq and Afghanistan rather than tending to its direct neighbor Mexico, which is on the verge of becoming a semifailed state due to drug cartel carnage.

A brilliant rebuttal to thinkers who suggest that globalism will trump geography, this indispensable work shows how timeless truths and natural facts can help prevent this century’s looming cataclysms.
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Editorial Reviews

Review

“[An] ambitious and challenging new book . . . [The Revenge of Geography]displays a formidable grasp of contemporary world politics and serves as a powerful reminder that it has been the planet’s geophysical configurations, as much as the flow of competing religions and ideologies, that have shaped human conflicts, past and present.”—Malise Ruthven, The New York Review of Books

“Robert D. Kaplan, the world-traveling reporter and intellectual whose fourteen books constitute a bedrock of penetrating exposition and analysis on the post-Cold War world . . . strips away much of the cant that suffuses public discourse these days on global developments and gets to a fundamental reality: that geography remains today, as it has been throughout history, one of the most powerful drivers of world events.”
The National Interest

“Kaplan plunges into a planetary review that is often thrilling in its sheer scale . . . encyclopedic.”
The New Yorker
 
“[
The Revenge of Geography] serves the facts straight up. . . . Kaplan’s realism and willingness to face hard facts make The Revenge of Geography a valuable antidote to the feel-good manifestoes that often masquerade as strategic thought.”The Daily Beast
 
“[A] remarkable new book . . . With such books as
Balkan Ghosts and Monsoon, Kaplan, an observer of world events who sees what others often do not, has already established himself as one of the most discerning geopolitical writers of our time. The Revenge of Geography cements his status.”National Review

About the Author

Robert D. Kaplan is the bestselling author of twenty books on foreign affairs and travel translated into many languages, including Adriatic, The Good AmericanThe Revenge of Geography, Asia’s Cauldron, Monsoon, The Coming Anarchy, and Balkan Ghosts. He holds the Robert Strausz-Hupé Chair in Geopolitics at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. For three decades he reported on foreign affairs for The Atlantic. He was a member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and the U.S. Navy’s Executive Panel. Foreign Policy magazine twice named him one of the world’s “Top 100 Global Thinkers.”

Product details

  • ASIN ‏ : ‎ 0812982223
  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Random House Trade Paperbacks; Reprint edition (September 10, 2013)
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • Paperback ‏ : ‎ 448 pages
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 9780812982220
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0812982220
  • Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 4.6 ounces
  • Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 7.76 x 5.08 x 0.44 inches
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.4 4.4 out of 5 stars 1,416 ratings

About the author

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Robert D. Kaplan
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Robert David Kaplan (born June 23, 1952 in New York City) is an American author of many books on politics primarily foreign affairs and travel, whose work over three decades has appeared in The Atlantic, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications.

His more controversial essays about the nature of US power have spurred debate and criticism in academia, the media, and the highest levels of government. One of Kaplan's most influential articles include "The Coming Anarchy", published in The Atlantic Monthly in 1994. Critics of the article has compared it to Huntingon's Clash of Civilizations thesis, since Kaplan presents conflicts in the contemporary world as the struggle between primitivism and civilizations. Another frequent theme in Kaplan's work is the reemergence of cultural and historical tensions temporarily suspended during the Cold War.

From March 2008 to spring 2012, Kaplan was a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, which he rejoined in 2015. Between 2012 and 2014, he was chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor, a private global forecasting firm. In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed Kaplan to the Defense Policy Board, a federal advisory committee to the United States Department of Defense. In 2011, Foreign Policy magazine named Kaplan as one of the world's "top 100 global thinkers."

Bio from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Photo by Rosalie Bolender [CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Customer reviews

4.4 out of 5 stars
4.4 out of 5
1,416 global ratings
Not a well-researched book
2 Stars
Not a well-researched book
Geography is still the final determinant of a country’s success is the central theme of the book in which Kaplan not only believes that geography dictates but also that the dictates of geography are monopolistic in nature. Kaplan's comments on Pakistan expose his lack of understanding on Pakistan and his lack of doing research on the given topic.For instance, on page 35, Kaplan writes: “Globalisation has itself spurred the rebirth of localism, built in many cases on ethnic and religious consciousness, which are anchored to specific landscapes, and thus explained best by reference to the relief map. This is because the forces of mass communications and economic integration have weakened the power of many states, including artificially conceived ones averse to the dictates of geography, leaving exposed in some critical areas a fractious, tottering world. Because of communications technology, pan-Islamic movements gain strengths across the entire Afro-Asian arc of Islam, even as individual Muslim state themselves are under siege from within. Take Iraq and Pakistan, which are in terms of geography arguably the two most illogically conceived states between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Subcontinent, even as the relief map decrees Afghanistan to be a weak state at best.” In this paragraph, the meaning of conceive is not to imagine but to create or formulate. Here, Kaplan first refers to Pakistan as an artificially conceived state, and then mentions Pakistan as one of the most illogically conceived state. Unfortunately, nowhere in the book does Kaplan mention the reasons for calling Pakistan an artificially and illogically conceived state. Erudition demands that Kaplan should have qualified his statements in the book, leaving no space for the readers to conjecture. However, seen against the background of the central idea of his book, Kaplan might have tried to say that the creation of Pakistan was against the dictates of geography understood only by him. In such cases, esotericism is a curse; exposition is a boon.Similarly, on page 243, Kaplan writes: “Founded in 1947 by Mohammad Ali Jinnah...Pakistan was built on an ideological premise: that of a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. And it was true, the majority of the subcontinent’s Muslims lived in West and East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh in 1971), yet many tens of millions of Muslims remained in India proper, so that Pakistan’s geographical contradictions rendered its ideology supremely imperfect.” In this paragraph, Kaplan opines that geographical contradictions produced by leaving tens of millions of Muslims behind in India proper has rendered Pakistan’s ideology — a homeland for Indian Muslims — absolutely imperfect. Kaplan seems to have not read the history of the Indian subcontinent that tells a reader that Indian Muslims had been divided into two halves. One half called Indian nationalist Muslims was against the division, while the other half called Muslim nationalists Muslims was demanding the division of the Indian subcontinent. The latter half got the country called Pakistan.Moreover, on the same page, Kaplan further writes: “The fact is that the subcontinent’s history of invasions and migrations makes for a plenteous ethnic, religious, and sectarian mix. For example, India is the birthplace of several religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians have lived in India for hundreds and thousands of years. The philosophy of the Indian state accepts this reality and celebrates it; the philosophy of the Pakistani state is far less inclusive. That is partly why India is stable and Pakistan is not.” In this paragraph, Kaplan acknowledges that the religious repertoire of the Indian subcontinent was the most heterogeneous in the world, whether the religions were indigenous or foreign. Further, he recognises that the geographical dictates or realities of the Indian subcontinent cannot be seen in isolation from its religious heterogeneity. However, what Kaplan has failed to realise is that when political realities were introduced into the Indian subcontinent, the religious heterogeneity became more palpable and, in many instances, inflammable. If the philosophy of religious heterogeneity tinkered with political dissension had been realised by the Hindus, Jinnah would have found no reason to present his famous 14 points in 1929 as a constitutional formula for socio-political coexistence. India has still failed to submit to this reality, and this is the reason it has dispatched its 600,000 — the number is unconfirmed — troops to its part of Kashmir to quell the current uprising for securing the right of self-determination of Kashmiris, which is a major challenge to the stability of India.On page 243, Kaplan also writes: “Pakistan is the home of four major ethnic groups [Punjabis, Sindhis, Baloch and Pashtuns], each harbouring hostility to others and each anchored to a specific region ...Islam was supposed to have provided the unifying glue for the state but it has signally failed in this regard.” This idea is extended further on page 246, where Kaplan writes: “[T]he case can be made that with the slow-motion dissolution of the former Soviet Empire in Central Asia, and the gradual weakening of the Pakistani state, a historic realignment is now taking place that could see Afghanistan disappear on the political map.” Here, Kaplan expresses his belief that internal ethnic disharmony is undermining the unity of Pakistan and that the disintegration of the former Soviet Union in December 1991 is having a domino effect on Pakistan to get disintegrated. In this regard, Kaplan needs to read the 18th Constitutional Amendment passed by the Parliament of Pakistan in April 2010 reinforcing the resolve of all four provinces representing the four major ethnicities to co-exist and strengthen federalism and democracy in Pakistan, and thereby offering the desired unifying glue — both written and reassuring — for the state of Pakistan.Kaplan seems to be morbidly infatuated with the idea that geography is still the final determinant of a country’s success, but the world, especially in the post-Cold War phase, has stretched beyond the dictates of geography into political and economic realms, disproving the monopoly of geography as a singular enforceable factor. Pakistan has also been fast coming out of the geographical dictates and resorting to undertaking new politico-economic alignments in the region. In short, Kaplan needs to educate himself on Pakistan’s history and update his knowledge on Pakistan’s developmental trajectory, instead of incessantly and despicably misinforming the world about Pakistan.
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Top reviews from the United States

Reviewed in the United States on February 24, 2013
I have been reading Robert Kaplan for almost twenty years now, and I never tire of his clear and calm analysis of the geo-political maelstrom that we find ourselves engulfed in. "Revenge of Geography" is by far his best work yet, a synthesis and re-examination of his thirty years of thinking and traveling, reading and writing.

His main argument is this: Geography is prime. Geography doesn't just refer to a country's size and its location on the globe -- ultimately, it refers to a people's access to food, security, and shelter: the abundance of resources a nation possesses, the opportunity it has to harvest and harness these resources, and how forcefully it can protect itself while menacing others.

And that's why the United States is king right now. Echoing de Tocqueville's analysis without actually mentioning him, Kaplan argues that the United States' bountiful resources, temperate climate, and security guaranteed by two oceans has helped turn it into history's greatest hegemon.

Geography is also why nations that have been relevant historically are still relevant today. Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran, and Turkey are all heirs to great empires and cultures made so by their geographical fortune, and they will be forever part of the geo-political landscape. That's why, in Kaplan's analysis, the United States must engage rather than contain these powers, especially in the cases of China, Iran, and Turkey.

Because of China's sudden geo-political and socio-economic rise, it's becoming a bully in the South China Sea, but it's a bully because it has yet to discover the trappings of power and because of its insecurity (it's surrounded by historical enemies -- Russia, India, and Japan -- on all sides). There will probably be an economic "correction" and great political instability in China in the next few years, but in the long-term China will only grow to challenge United States hegemony. But Kaplan is optimistic here: It's in the best interest of both nations to control the sea lanes to facilitate trade, and China and the United States have no real geo-political conflicts with each other (which is not the case between China and Russia).

Then there's Iran and Turkey. While they're Muslim countries, Kaplan argues that both set themselves apart with their cultural legacy and brilliance. It's the error of the United States to attempt to contain or blockade Iran, and to deny Turkey membership into NATO. Iran is too geographically important (it controls the Strait of Hormuz, through which most of the world's petroleum travels) to ignore or deter -- and with American support and engagement it could very well become a democracy, a political event that would forever change the Middle East (in a way that America's invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq did not).

Kaplan has strong criticisms of America, which he believes is too focused on overseas adventures to take seriously the threat down south: Mexico. Mexico's continuing failure as a state portends political problems within America: Demographers believe that by 2050 one-third of all Americans will speak Spanish, with the majority of Spanish speakers coming from Mexico. This would not only create domestic turmoil, but also hamper America's ability to use its immigration laws to pilfer the world's best and brightest. In the short-term and in the long-term, America is better off using its incredible resources and talent to help avert crisis in Mexico, and turn it into a stable democracy.

Even after three decades of writing on geo-political issues, Kaplan continues to surprise and delight with this breadth of knowledge and experience, and his willingness to challenge conventional thinking by first challenging his own.
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Reviewed in the United States on December 11, 2012
This is a review of The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate [Hardcover]
Mugged by Geography

An old saw has it that a neo-conservative is a liberal mugged by reality. And, to paraphrase, a neo-conservative becomes a realist because he is mugged by geography. When? It happens soon after "the end of history" in the wake of 1989, rendering geography allegedly obsolete with a little help from modern technology. And so the airpower of Gulf War One putatively liberates us from the shackles of distance and terrain. But then the Balkans blow up and the Twin Towers collapse. We are back in Iraq after 9/11 and "it is surely wrong to suggest that physical terrain no longer mattered" (p. 22). Suddenly, geography is back with a vengeance. "Geography constitutes the very facts about international affairs that are so basic we take them for granted" (p. 30). And it is our permanent thing in the battle for power. "Geopolitics and the competition for `space' is eternal" (p. 88). The objective now is therefore "to have an appreciation of the map so that, counterintuitively, we need not always be bounded by it" (p. 29) for "I wish to argue for a modest acceptance of fate, secured ultimately in the facts of geography, in order to curb excessive zeal in foreign policy, a zeal of which I myself have been guilty" (p. 36).

Thus, the newly minted realist develops a vision. A global "Mittleeuropa writ large" shall arise, "an ideal of tolerance and high civilization," according to a liberal dream of Friedrich List and Timothy Garton Ash (p. 11). This will be apparently a worldwide community of liberal democracy triumphant, not to be confused with an artificial construct like "the super-state of the European Union [which] has only abstract meaning to all but the elite" (p. 48). Meanwhile, the United States shall continue to fade. No longer a hegemonic hyperpower, America can continue to dominate regionally, but only if it "fixes" Mexico. Yet, even if it avoids a calamitous ending, it shall dissolve into a federation of gargantuan city-states, horizontally integrating the union and, thus, maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia. "A world balanced is a world free" (p. 346). Yet, "the world will be both duller and more dangerous than ever before" (p. 128). This, at least, is the latest geopolitical vision of the globetrotting declineist Robert Kaplan. An aspiring master of a "closed system" (p. 73), the author conceptualizes the globe as a single cohesive unit. It is a tempting simplification, but no, thanks, in particular if it leads to the self-fulfilling prophecy of America's collapse.

Granted, all things human end. America will too. But its demise is far off. And so is Kaplan's prediction. Or is it? Ultimately, the Lord only knows. But, perhaps, others can divine with some accuracy. Thus, the author treats us to Mackinder, Mahan, Ratzel, Spykman, Strausz-Hupé, and a whole parade of other strategic giants long forgotten, undeservedly, because of the association of their grand schemes with sexy intellectual fashions of yore, now recognized as noxious determinism, militarism, racism, social Darwinism, and so forth. Yet, let us remember that "geography informs, rather than determines. Geography, therefore, is not synonymous with fatalism. But it is, like the distribution of economic and military power themselves, a major constraint on - and instigator of - the actions of states" (p. 29). Both globalization and localism are the context. They influence one another, while the former also triggers both "conflict and cooperation" (p. 102). Further Kaplan ably marries the awesome geostrategists with the encyclopedic scholars of comparative civilizations like Toynbee, Hodgson, Lewis, and Huntington. By clinging fast to his belief in the individual's free will, the author distills their teachings to stress that "of course, geography, history, and ethnic characteristics influence but do not determine future events" (p. 36).

Qualifying his analysis thus, the modern-day neo-geostrategist makes a strong case for the utility of geopolitics in prognostication. This applies both to short and long term predictions. The former, of course, sound more plausible than the latter. It is the present and not the future that Kaplan describes when he paints vividly the menacing specter of global chaos as Third World countries, in Asia in particular, go nuclear and more nationalistic. They suffer from the "crisis of room" (p. 115). Thus, they are prone to push against each other. It is "a world of crowded megacities" and soon "a world of multidimensional brinkmanship" as nuclear crises proliferate profligately (p. 119). These areas already heave with underage males prone to radical ideologies and easily mobilized through the new media for transnational causes, religious (Islamic) fundamentalism in particular. In the future, Kaplan promises more of the same but even more intense. Asia will become a battlefield of the 21st century, just as Europe was until the mid-20th century. And "the megacity will be at the heart of twenty-first-century geography" (p. 120).

The predictions are vividly grim: "A Eurasia and North Africa of vast, urban concentrations, overlapping missile ranges, and sensational global media will be one of constantly enraged crowds, fed by rumors and half-truth transported at the speed of light by satellite channels across the rimlands and heartland expanse, from one Third World city to another. Conversely, the crowd, empowered by social media like Twitter and Facebook, will also be fed by the very truth that autocratic rulers have denied it... In other words, politics in the mass media age will be more intense than anything we have experienced, because the past and future will have been obliterated... It is in the megacities of Eurasia principally where crowd psychology will have its greatest geopolitical impact" (p. 122-123). Crisis management will be a daily pursuit: "With civilizations densely packed one against the other, and the media a vehicle for constant verbal outrages, as well as for popular pressure from oppressed groups, the need for quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy will never be greater. One crisis will flow into the next, and there will be perennial need for everyone to calm down" (p. 127).

Operating with bold strokes of a global brush, Kaplan is predictably and overly kind to the mighty. China grapples eternally with the dilemma of core vs. periphery; so does Russia. Both are vulnerable to foreign attack. In this telling, Chinese and Russian imperialisms are mere functions of self-defense. All those foreign invasions warrant expansion. Really? How many invasions has "Russia" experienced in the past 800 years in comparison to, say, Poland? A hundred times fewer, Moscow has. "A legacy of depredations against Russia" should be taken with a generous grain of salt, except by the Mongol Empire, Napoleonic France, and the Third Reich (p. 150). That is three serious incursions in 800 years. The same osmotic logic prompts the author to embrace other aspects of imperial propaganda. In particular, Kaplan accepts everything that Moscow dubs "Russia," including historical places like Rus'. Ukraine anyone? It is pivotal only at present as an intended, and inevitable, victim of the reintegrating post-Soviet behemoth operating out of the Kremlin. "Now Russia, greatly reduced in size, tries to reconsolidate that same Heartland - Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia" (p. 78). At least Kaplan got this reintegrating post-Soviet drive precisely right, despite the tendency to take at face value the standard trope of Russian imperialist apologetics.

Unlike Stratfor's George Friedman, Kaplan strangely has no room for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Is it because it would undermine his Moscow-centric paradigm of Eurasia? The Commonwealth is arguably European history's greatest secret and should be listed in the same breath with "the legacies of Prussian, Habsburg, and Byzantine and Ottoman rules [which] are still relevant" (p. 146). At least the author has a soft spot for the western post-Soviet zone. "The degree to which Central and Eastern Europe can develop a belt of prosperous and stable states from the ashes of communism will go a long way to protect Europe from Russia, and, in the process, convert the dream of a revived Mitteleuropa into reality: a dream that liberal intellectuals actually share with Mackinder" (p. 136).

Yet, the Mittleeuropa does not really exist in the Mackinderian scheme of things. Someone must control "the geographic pivot of history" so the barbarians from the East would not pour into Europe. Too bad it has to be Russia, but better the Muscovite state than "the yellow peril." Albeit unattractive, Russia is thus indispensible in Mackinder's geopolitical imagination. "In short, strategically speaking, there is `no space' for Central Europe" (p. 9). It is an artificial construct, a springboard toward a Haushoferian Lebensraum or a causeway from Asia into Europe proper, which, in itself, is just an Asian peninsula jutting toward the Atlantic Ocean. What is Europe then? It is a map in flux. It is constructed on the basis of Charlemagne's ancient realm in the West, encompassing the post-Soviet zone and even North Africa, with power increasingly shifting to Berlin. The mighty rule.

Yet, the dwarves of the world are not helpless. Kaplan rejects geographic determinism and fatalism with this valuable piece of advice: "A small state in the midst of adversaries, such as Israel, has to be particularly passive, or particularly aggressive, in order to survive. It is primarily a matter of geography" (p. 34). Anyone listening between Berlin and Moscow? The same applies to "the power of statelessness" (p. 126). According to the author, "small stateless groups are beneficiaries of this new age of technology" of death (p. 126-127).

Still, one rejoices that this influential neo-conservative realist restores geography to its rightful place of permanence in the global calculus of power. "Geography offers a way to make at least some sense of it all" (p. xxii). And: "Just as geography is not an explanation for everything, neither is it a solution. Geography is merely the unchanging backdrop against which the battle of ideas plays out" (p. 177). Those who ignore geography do so at their peril. But the journalist qualifies this common sense observation by allowing that "the revenge of geography" is balanced by "the defeat of geography" by technology (transport and communication revolutions in particular). Geography remains relevant but not omnipotent. Thus, in this telling, geography serves as a reality check on our designs and actions, rather than a fatalistic determinant. Impersonal forces of geography rule. But they do not rule supreme.

It is a pleasure to read Kaplan if only to revisit thinkers too long out of favor. Naturally, one cringes at some of his sentiments. For example, "there are things worse than communism," he deadpans, "and in Iraq we brought them about ourselves" (p. 21). This was not the author's preference of Stalin over Saddam, one should hope, but, rather, an awkwardly phrased confession of his appreciation for order over chaos. Yet, if chaos is counter-revolutionary, then it is better than any Communist totalitarian order which is an order of the prison, if not an outright order of the grave, as Angelo Codevilla would remark. This applies to all totalitarian regimes: For a Jew, chaos under Nazism meant hope of survival; order spelled death. One derives such knowledge from a posteriori inquiries, the essence of conservatism. We are delighted that Robert Kaplan's experience has been a corrective on his original liberal ideology. Now that the neo-geopolitician has been mugged by geography, perhaps he can be encouraged to delve into First Things, which are at the root of our understanding of the universe, including geography.

Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House, 2012).

Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
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HARDEEP
5.0 out of 5 stars Must read
Reviewed in India on April 18, 2024
Great book to understand the international relations and role of geography for the growth of a country
Alessandra
5.0 out of 5 stars Libro incredibile. Attualissimo ancora oggi. L’importanza dimenticata della geografia.
Reviewed in Italy on November 8, 2022
La lettura geografica del mondo e di come la componente ambientale possa condizionare, non determinare, la strategia nazionale e gli equilibri e disequilibri nell’ordine mondiale.
Cliente de Amazon
5.0 out of 5 stars Excelente libro
Reviewed in Mexico on June 24, 2020
Muy recomendable para internacionalistas
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Dan Earle
5.0 out of 5 stars Read this to understand today's news.
Reviewed in Canada on September 17, 2015
I really loved this book and it reinforces my conviction that one of the most important subjects in school is geography - the interrelationships of physical, cultural and economic conditions - which is also one of the most poorly taught subjects in our schools. The author makes a case for geographic determinism but is not obsessive about it. More importantly, he shows how geographic elements like mountain ranges, oceans, river systems, latitude, natural resources, collections of people in tribes and nations do have an impact on how our world works. The accompanying maps are very useful and I am keeping them on hand for future reference as I read the news. Before reading the book I sort of knew where places were but now I can really see the bigger picture and understand much better what is going on in the power politics of today.
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Virginia Noel
5.0 out of 5 stars Great
Reviewed in Spain on April 24, 2016
I study geography and I found that this book is very good to gettinknow the problems arround the world and more....